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Abstract 
The normalisation of insecure work in contemporary western economies has attracted 
increased academic attention, leading to a plethora of critiques on the conditions of 
insecure work and the economic and social structures which underlie them. In this thesis, I 
focus on the paradoxical way freedom both legitimises and contests precarious work. I 
explore how freedom and precarity act as tools of coercion and governing and conversely 
how freedom and precarity offer potentialities for resistance and provide opportunities to 
challenge neoliberal norms. Within the confines of this thesis I investigate Isabel Lorey’s 
theory of precarisation as a governmental process, based on Foucault’s genealogical 
problematising of dominant narratives designed to more easily govern populations. 
However, I also explore aspects of Judith Butler’s account of the wider implications of a 
precariousness that is inherent in our existential being, reflecting a physical vulnerability 
that drives individuals together to form protection in order to survive. In a modern 
context, where our inter-dependability is often made invisible and our survivability is linked 
to our individual endeavour and measured by our income, precarity in the form of insecure 
work often has wider societal implications and is driven by an existential precariousness. 
These implications impact both our individual identity and social fractures which justify 
exploitation for some, in order to secure a more livable life for others. This rhetoric 
highlights the often contradictory narrative of freedom. The often resulting atomisation 
and disparity of precarity, also offers new and diverse opportunities to defy neoliberal 
subjectivities, reformulating a narrative of freedom outside the market. However, the very 
diverse and disparate nature of precarity does also provide a challenging context for a 
cohesive protest movement. Conversely precarious resistance suggests new multiple sites of 
resistance, again challenging a discourse of freedom that is built on homogeneity and class 
solidarity.     
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Precarity references a particular notion of, and social contract around, work. Work that is secure; 
work that secures not only income and job but identity and lifestyle, linking capitalism and intimacy 
in an affective desire for security itself. Precarity marks the loss of this – the loss of something that 
only certain countries, at certain historical periods, and certain workers ever had in the first place. 
(Allison, 2013, p. 7) 
 
Anne Allison (2013) begins her book Precarious Japan, with a news item detailing the death 
of a fifty five year old man from starvation. Previously employed as a public official, disease 
had prevented him from working, and social support had suddenly been cut off. With no 
money and nowhere to turn, over the next three months, as he slowly starved to death, he 
kept a journal wondering what his country did for citizens like him, who struggling to live 
had no option but to die (pp 1-2). In highlighting this particular story, Allison emphasises 
the intersection of precarity, precariousness and precarisation. An existential precariousness 
that emphasises our physical vulnerability, a precarity resulting from neoliberal discourses 
that determine an allocation of resources based on an individual’s productivity and 
precarisation as a process of governing that reduces choices and undermines freedom. As 
neoliberalism becomes ever more normalised, individual survivability is increasingly 
dependent on an ability to earn. However, inherent in neoliberalism is a structural 
inequality which heavily influences our capacity to earn and our social expectations of 
support, both political and economic. This precarity highlights not only economic 
insecurity but a wider affective impact on individual identity that demarcates society, 
marking some lives as more worthy of being livable. 
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Precarity has increasingly become a focus of concern as jobs and incomes have 
become progressively insecure, in those societies where secure employment was once seen 
as the norm. This transition away from regular secure employment to flexible uncertain 
hours and income, has been underscored by a neoliberal concept of freedom that 
presupposes an equality of choice in employment conditions and which valorises risk in a 
highly competitive Darwinian style marketised environment. For some contractors 
employed in the so called ‘gig economy’ precarious employment has delivered on the 
promise of greater flexibility and more choice in work and in life (McGovern, 2017; 
Kaufman, 2013), while others have experienced precarity as increasingly exploitative, 
limiting their options, their forms of resistance even at times their ability to survive (Butler, 
2018; Groot, Van Ommen, Masters-Awatere, Tassell-Matamua,  2017; Lorey, 2015; 
Standing, 2016;). In an environment where an individual’s productivity directly influences 
their ability to survive, the political and economic restructuring of employment relations 
towards greater insecurity in the name of freedom, would seem far less positive and more 
complex, than neoliberal enthusiasts of the 1980s would have had us believe. Thus, the 
wider impacts of social and emotional vulnerability linked to insecure work are often far 
more pervasive than a narrative of freedom in flexible work would suggest.  
 Neoliberalism as an international economic policy epitomised by deregulation, 
privatisation and the withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision, became 
dominant during the 1980s. Endorsed by both the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank and the World Trade Organisation, neoliberalism became hegemonic as a mode of 
discourse (Harvey, 2007, p. 3). The neoliberal economic process this change entailed, was 
underpinned by a language which conflated individual freedom with reduced regulation of 
the market by the state and a roll back of social support, including a dismantling of 
worker’s rights. Although neoliberalism was an economic principle, its transformative 
power lay in the extensive reshaping of social and political norms which effectively 
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disseminated the model of the market to all domains and activities. This resulted in 
reconfiguring human beings and their interactions, making neoliberalism the commonsense 
way many of us interpret, live in and understand the world (Brown, 2016; Harvey, 2007)). 
F. A. Hayek who was a founding advocate for neoliberalism wrote in his book The Road to 
Serfdom originally published in 1944, 
The planning for security which has such an insidious effect on liberty is that for security 
of a different kind. It is planning designed to protect individuals or groups against 
diminutions of their income, which although in no way deserved yet in a competitive 
society occurs daily, against losses imposing severe hardships having no moral justification 
yet inseparable from the competitive system. . . This kind of security or justice seems 
irreconcilable with freedom to choose one’s employment. (1994, p. 135). 
Thus, Hayek links secure income to a loss of freedom and a lack of moral 
accountability. In New Zealand, under neoliberal economic policies, the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991(ECA) the Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA) and the 
Employment Relations (Film Production Work) Amendment Bill 2010 (the Hobbit Law), 
were instrumental in restructuring employment relations, creating an environment in which 
employment contracts have become increasingly competitive and diverse.  This has 
resulted in a neoliberal privileging of competition, risk taking and flexibility in employment 
positions, while ignoring asymmetric positions of power inherent in individuals negotiating 
with companies for employment 1. In a 2013, New Zealand Council of Trade Unions 
(NZCTU) report, it was estimated that at least 30 percent of New Zealand workers at that 
time were employed in insecure work (NZCTU, 2013, p. 8). The NZCTU defines insecure 
work as  
 
1 Although some professions negotiate their employment contracts collectively, for example teachers, 
precarious employment is still increasing even within these sectors, as outlined in a paper by the PPTA (2016) 
titled “Teachers in the precariat; fixed term contracts and the effects on establishing teachers” This highlights 
how even among collectively negotiated employment contracts, there are still individual differences 
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work where the variable and changing nature of a job suits the employer but not the 
worker. It is work where the burden of adjustment falls on the worker, and the inequality 
of power in the employment or contractual relationship disadvantages the person doing the 
work. (2016, p. 2).  
This is where this thesis began, with a recognition of the normalisation of insecure or 
precarious work, which was framed as an expression of freedom within a neoliberal 
ideology, despite an acknowledgement of the increasingly exploitable position workers 
were placed in. 
However, the empirical nature of insecure work seems to be part of a larger 
dynamic, one in which the complex interaction of freedom and precarity both contests and 
legitimises insecurity. Precarity itself is often defined as social, political and economic 
structures which effectively demarcate individuals and segments of the population as 
vulnerable, through an unequal access to those resources (Butler, 2004, 2010, 2016; Lorey, 
2015; Millar, 2016; Nielson & Rossiter 2005, 2008). This, therefore, expands the concept of 
precarious work and problematises previously invisible constructs of power, which 
effectively entrench and legitimise precarity in already vulnerable populations. This is made 
obvious when we recognise the highly gendered ratio of precarious work (Betti, 2016, 2018; 
Vosko, 2000) or the discursive positioning of migrant labour as cheap and disposable 
(Jorgensen, 2015; Lorey, 2015; McCormack & Salmenniemi, 2016; Nielson & Rossiter, 
2008; Standing, 2017). Another aspect of precarity is the precariousness of embodied 
beings, the inherent vulnerability of existing in a physical body. Our commonplace reaction 
against this existential precariousness, is to form groups finding security in others, 
highlighting our intrinsic inter-dependability, despite a neoliberal privileging of the 
individual as central to our market driven society.  
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  Precarity, precariousness and precarisation are often defined as separate concepts, 
nevertheless they naturally overlap and intersect with one another. Precarity as a term often 
designates a definition, while also commonly being used to refer to an overarching concept 
that covers all three definitions. Lorey (2015) defines the three terms separately as: 
precariousness, which she recognises as being based on Judith Butler’s definition as “the 
socio-ontological dimension of lives and bodies” (p. 11), precarity as “a category of order, 
which designates the effects of different political, social and legal compensations of a 
general precariousness” (p. 12) and governmental precarisation as an art of governing that 
“means not only a destabilisation through employment, but also destabilisation of the 
conduct of life and thus of bodies and modes of subjectification” (p. 13).  These definitions 
are discussed in more detail in my literature review, however, it is important to note that 
Lorey argues, that precarisation as an instrument of governing is built on an idea of 
freedom, that subjugates the individual to economic exploitation and insecurity. At the 
same time, as the individual is influenced and cajoled into accepting and complying with 
neoliberal norms, there remains at the site of subjugation, the potential for refusal which in 
itself represents freedom.  Thus, freedom can be understood as both legitimising and 
contesting precarity. While questions remain not only over how much potential exists to 
contest precarity, but also how precarious resistance given its diverse and disparate 
characteristics would be possible, the ambivalent nature of freedom in precarity itself 
remains often under theorised. 
This is further highlighted in my literature review, where theorists implicitly discuss 
precarity as freedom limiting. In this respect Isabel Lorey in her book State of Insecurity, 
Government of the precarious (2015), which places freedom as a central theme in her 
examination of precarity, is unusual. As such her thesis of precaritisation as a governmental 
narrative is one of the more original theories to explore the connections between precarity, 
freedom and domination. Her analysis is built on Michel Foucault’s biopolitics, which itself 
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explores the association between freedom as empowerment and conversely subjugation 
within a neoliberal context. As such this thesis explores not just the ways in which precarity 
dominates and limits people’s freedom, but also how precarity can be a source of 
resistance, challenging neoliberal narratives and constructing a new understanding of 
freedom based on our inter-relationality and inter-dependability.  
While Lorey remains a primary focus of my thesis, the literature review also 
emphasises the diversity of precarious research, with theorists debating over who is 
precarious? How to define precarity? Whether precarity is the exception or the norm? or 
can precarious workers form a class? That precarity is unequally distributed and intersects 
along race and gendered lines is commonly accepted, however, whether precarity crosses 
socio-economic boundaries, is an analytical concept, a class, a social movement, an 
empirical category, an existential reality, a process of governing, or whether it has aspects 
of all of the above, remains much contested. 
While my literature review discusses the broader academic landscape of precarity, 
my conceptual framework focuses predominately on Foucault’s thesis on biopolitics which 
forms the foundation for Lorey’s theory of precarisation. As Lorey and Foucault situate 
freedom as a central tenet to their exploration of liberal governance, their framework 
provides valuable tools to explore the paradoxical relationship of freedom and precarity. 
Lorey’s theory of precarisation is heavily influenced by Foucault’s biopolitics, although she 
does weave in other theorists to develop an original and comprehensive theory, her 
exploration of precarity is primarily Foucauldian. Foucault’s biopolitics and 
governmentality, offers a genealogical approach to problematising neoliberalism’s 
reconstruction of freedom as based in the market, while highlighting the constitutive nature 
of neoliberal norms both as they are espoused by capital and the state. He also explores 
how these norms  are formed and embedded at the capillaries of society, in our day to day 
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actions with one another. Lorey than updates Foucault’s theories applying them to a 
contemporary setting by analysing precarity.  
Using Lorey and Foucault as a framework, chapter one further unpacks Lorey’s 
theory of precarisation as a governmental process. Lorey looks at precarisation at a 
population level and at an individual level, exposing how even those decisions supposedly 
freely made are often enclosed by neoliberal disciplinary norms privileging certain 
behaviours as successful and desirable. Lorey also problematises a discourse of infection at 
a population level, arguing that using precarity as a threat motif both by stressing the 
invasion of cheap precarious labour, and the threat of more jobs becoming insecure, 
encourages compliance with neoliberal ideals. At the centre of Lorey’s thesis is an 
interrogation of freedom versus an indoctrination of neoliberal norms. This is signified in 
her analysis of self-precarisation as an act which represents neoliberal exploitation rather 
than the freedom to which it is usually ascribed.   
Chapter two explores the changing dynamic of a Fordist narrative of freedom 
commonly associated with security, co-existing alongside a neoliberal discourse of freedom 
linked to insecurity. By problematising a neoliberal narrative of freedom, Lorey emphasises 
the constructive nature of a definition of freedom that is inherently inter-relational, even as 
it idealises the individual. Both Lorey and Butler argue for a new definition of freedom 
which expands beyond the security/insecurity paradigm. Further they contend that an 
autonomous freedom built on performativity and inter-relationality provides a platform 
which contests the unequal allocation of precarity. In order to challenge neoliberal 
freedom, they both dissect and reconstruct Hannah Arendt’s republican freedom in her 
1961 essay “What is Freedom”. However though at times both Butler and Lorey agree, the 
different focus they bring to Arendt’s essay adds complexity and richness to fundamental 
questions on communal freedom and individual autonomy in precarity. 
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Following on from chapter two, chapter three explores resistance to precarity as an 
expression of freedom. By exploring different approaches and conceptions of precarious 
resistance this chapter I highlight the diversity and disparity of precarity.  Guy Standing’s 
new dangerous class, Isabel Lorey’s discussion of care strikes and Judith Butler’s politics of 
vulnerability, offer distinct and often contesting foundations for resistance. In particular the 
positioning of migrants within precarious resistance, as either the sullen silent problem, or 
the revolutionary force that ultimately challenges structures of power that justify precarity, 
exposes differing normative assumptions that often frame precarious resistance. In 
acknowledging precarious resistance as forms of protest that take flight from institutions 
and from formal rules of politics, by embracing a composition of singularities 
encompassing an unstable, networked patchwork loving multiplicity (Han, 2018, p. 337) 
precarity as a protest movement can challenge conventional interpretations. Both Lorey 
and Butler, argue that vulnerability does not conflate with a lack of autonomy. In this way 
they are breaking open the security/insecurity dynamic linked to freedom, arguing instead 
that freedom exists even in vulnerability. However, this all encompassing definition of 
freedom does risk losing a cohesive focus to challenge systemic exploitation that induces 
precarity. 
Freedom and precarity are then understood as separate but inextricably intertwined. 
Although some theorists may situate them  as oppositional ( Bourdieu, 1992; Castel, 2016; 
Standing, 2016), others understand the relationship as more complex, (Butler, 2016; Lorey, 
2015), seeking an idea of freedom that is not subject to precarity, but is based on our inter-
dependency and inter-relationality. In this way precarity itself does not define people’s 
freedom or undermine their autonomy.  Instead freedom becomes a platform which can 
challenge the legitimacy of precarity, which is based on an understanding of an individual 
as a commodified entrepreneurial economic unit. Rather our inherent precariousness has 
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Precarity is not a recent phenomenon, but it has recently become a contested field of 
academic debate. This has resulted in an increase in literature and academic focus on 
precarity, precariousness, precarisation and the precariat. Within this burgeoning analysis of 
precarity, the role of freedom is often under analysed. Typically, when examining precarity, 
a degrading sense of freedom is implied.  However, freedom often plays a ambivalent role 
in the legitimising of precarity and the consequent resistance to precarity. Although 
theorists may argue that freedom is in the choices people make such as choosing precarious 
work or not (Friedman, 2002; Hayek, 1994), this simply draws attention to how much 
choice precarious workers actually have, or whether social, economic and political 
structures act to limit individuals choices, even while upholding a narrative of freedom. In 
this review, I explore the literature which categorises different definitions of precarity, 
precariousness, the precariat and precarisation and how those definitions can frame 
freedom and resistance differently. Although I focus on freedom which has a rich 
philosophical history of academic debate, my attention is specifically on how freedom both 
contests and/or legitimises precarity. As such my focus is primarily on precarity and 
freedom, within a governmentality context, of which Isabell Lorey is a fundamental 
theorist.  
 
Precarity, Precariousness, Precarisation and the Precariat. 
The literature on precarity often separates this concept into three main strands of theory, 
precarity, precariousness and precarisation (Butler, 2006, 2010, 2011; Ettlinger, 2007; 
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Lorey, 2009, 2010, 2015; Masquelier, 2018; Millar, 2017; Moisander, 2018; Neilson & 
Rossiter, 2005, 2008; among others). Precarity often appears to be used both as an 
overarching concept as well as a specific strand of theory. In this way precarity 
encompasses precarisation and precariousness and is the foundation for the precariat, while 
also being used to specifically highlight the unequal distribution of resources leading to 
insecure employment and emotional and mental vulnerability (Ettlinger 2007; Millar, 2017). 
This may be a result of the way precarity developed as a conceptual framework within 
contemporary academia (Betti, 2018).  Precarity has a long history of political and socio-
economic debates, with Betti 2018 drawing attention to precarity as an issue in ancient 
Greece and later with Karl Marx’s analysis of the lumpenproletariat. However, many 
theorists recognise that contemporary debates around precarity  began with Pierre 
Bourdieu’s book Acts of Resistance, (1998), which links precarity to a rise in insecure 
employment, resulting from neoliberal reforms (Betti, 2018; Brown, 2015;  Groot, et al, 
2017; Lorey 2015; Millar, 2017). This influenced an initial framework and definition of 
precarity as primarily a labour condition. As such academic debate in this area has mostly 
been driven by analysing neoliberal restructuring of work practices, resulting from a 
changing power dynamic between capital and labour in Western economies. Arne 
Kalleberg in “Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: Employment Relations in Transition” 
(2009) connects insecure work to wider societal insecurities in a way that typifies this 
understanding: 
Precarious work has far-reaching consequences . . .  Creating insecurity for many people, it 
has pervasive consequences not only for the nature of work, workplaces, and people’s 
work experiences, but also for many nonwork individual (e.g., stress, education), social 
(e.g., family, community), and political (e.g., stability, democratization) outcomes. (p. 2). 
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 Consequently, many theorists have built on and expanded this definition, linking insecure 
work to wider societal insecurities (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007; Castel, 2002 & 2016; De 
Poutier, 2011; Lorey, 2015; Standing, 2017).  
  Many theorists (Butler, 2018; Castel, 2002, 2016; Lorey, 2015; Jorgensen, 2015; 
Han, 2018, Neilson & Rossiter, 2008; Standing, 2016) acknowledge that the first 
EuroMayDay protest of precarious working conditions held in 2001, brought precarity in 
Europe to a wider audience. This ultimately reinforced the connection between precarity 
and insecure work, thus bringing the concept into a social and political realm. Guy 
Standing in his book The Precariat; The New Dangerous Class first published in 2011, begins by 
describing the rising consciousness and collective action of people across all aspects of life 
who share this experience of insecure work personified, he believes, by the EuroMayDay 
protests. Standing argues that precarious work conditions have created a distinctive socio-
economic class, that is defined by a lack of work based identity and seven other forms of 
labour insecurity, including employment security, skill reproduction security and 
representation security (p. 12)2. For Standing, precarious work is one of the defining 
features of a new class in the making, demarcated by the lack of access to social, political 
and economic resources which leads to a wider societal insecurity and discontent. He 
characterises affected individuals as denizens based on the degradation of their rights as 
citizens (p. 15). Standing defines the precariat as  “a class in the making, if not yet a class 
for itself in the Marxist sense of that term” (2017, p. 8). He argues that the precariat is at 
war with itself, and not yet able to articulate a collective identity or put forward a political 
programme. Standing’s definition of the precariat has attracted considerable debate 
(Munck, 2013; Nielson & Rossiter, 2005; Wright, 2015) which will be covered in more 
depth later in this literature review. 
 
2 I discuss this in more detail in chapter three. 
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In contrast to Bourdieu and Standing’s definitions, Butler offers a definition of 
precariousness that is based on an inherent vulnerability that exists in all human beings. In 
Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (2004), Butler defines precariousness as “a 
common human vulnerability, one that emerges with life itself” (p. 31). Although Butler’s 
definition highlights the commonality of precariousness, extending it to encompass 
everyone, she differentiates an existential precariousness with a concept of precarity that is 
distributed unequally across society. Precarity, Butler argues is a “politically induced 
condition in which certain populations suffer from failing social and economic networks of 
support more than others and become differentially exposed to injury violence and death” 
(2018. p. 33).  Butler’s definition and analysis of precarity and precariousness as two 
distinct but overlapping concepts has opened up academic discourses on precarity by 
linking it to a wider ontological sense of vulnerability (Allison, 2012; Lorey, 2015; Millar, 
2017; Mole, 2010).  
Isabel Lorey in State of Insecurity: Government of the precarious (2015), defines the 
precarious as having three dimensions; precariousness, precarity and precarisation (p. 110). 
Precariousness, Lorey argues, is a term for the socio-ontological dimension of life and of 
bodies. In this definition she references Butler’s thesis pointing out that precariousness is 
relational and therefore shared with other lives. The second dimension which she labels 
precarity and defines as “a category of order, which designates the effects of different 
political, social and legal compensations of a general precariousness” (p. 12). In precarity 
Lorey perceives a hierarchisation in the unequal distribution of the relations of power. In 
this dimension Lorey recognises a process of othering to legitimise insecure lives and a lack 
of power and agency for those in this position. The third and final dimension of the 
precarious Lorey identifies as governmental precarisation which she designates as a form of 
social regulation. In governmental precarisation, Lorey seeks to problematise “the complex 
interactions between an instrument of governing and the conditions of economic 
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exploitation” (p. 13). In this third category, Lorey explores destabilisation through 
employment and conducts of life affecting bodies and modes of subjectivation. As a 
governmental narrative and/or action, precarisation is a process of destabilising others to 
secure an increasingly diminishing centre. All three dimensions of the precarious co-exist 
together with different degrees of influence throughout history, thereby influencing 
economic, social and political relations. Lorey’s definition of precarity encompasses a 
labourist concept of the empirical nature of precarity and a philosophical ontological 
aspect, while incorporating the structural normalisation of precarity under neoliberalism. 
 
Freedom and Precarity 
While freedom is often under theorised in precarious literature, neoliberal freedom, that is 
a freedom associated with the market,  is frequently related with the underpinnings of 
precarity (Berlant, 2011; Brown, 2015; Castel, 2002, 2016; De Poutier, 2011; Lorey, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2015; Standing, 2015). As such this definition of freedom reflects a change in 
international economic, social and political narratives from the 1980s on (Chang, 2014; 
Foucault, 2007, 2008; Harvey, 2007). Friedman (2002) and Hayek (1994) as foundational 
members of the Mont Pelerin Society, a group of neoliberal supporters, define freedom as 
being free from state regulation, conflating personal freedom with an unregulated free 
market. Freidman (2002) states,  
Political freedom means the absence of coercion of a man [sic] by his fellow men 
[sic]. The fundamental threat to freedom is power to coerce, be it in the hands of a 
monarch, a dictator, an oligarchy, or a momentary majority. . . By removing the 
organisation of economic activity from the control of political authority, the market 
eliminates this source of political authority, the market eliminates this source of 
coercive power. (p. 15).  
- 19 - 
 
  Foucault’s (1982, 2007, 2008) analysis on biopolitics and governmentality then 
further builds on how a normative definition of individual freedom exercised in the market 
fundamentally shifted hegemonic discourses towards individualised ideals of citizens as 
entrepreneurial units, that has consequently extended to all aspects of life. Freedom is 
central to Foucault’s thesis on neoliberalism as a governing tool to control and manipulate 
populations. As such, theorists have further developed Foucault’s theories to challenge a 
contradictory definition of freedom that is linked increasingly to subjectification and 
control (Brown 2015; Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Dean, 2010; Read, 2009; Rose, 
1999; Lemke, 2011). While Foucault himself never directly addresses precarity as a 
biopolitical tool for governing3, several precarity theorists have used his thesis as a 
framework for highlighting the exploitative nature of precarity (Jorgensen, 2015; Lorey, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2015; McCormack & Salmenniemi, 2016; Masquelier, 2018; Moisander, 
Eraranta & Grob, 2018).Within this group Lorey4 exclusively develops Foucault’s theory of 
biopolitics to problematise the use of precarity as a governmental process for managing the 
population. In doing this, she addresses the complex use of freedom to frame 
subjectification’s towards neoliberal identities and the basis of that subjectification also 
being the site for resistance, as an articulation of freedom. While Lorey’s theory of 
precarisation is relatively unique, her work is becoming more widely acknowledged (Butler, 
2010, 2018; Jorgensen, 2015; Millar, 2017) 
While freedom is commonly recognised within the literature on precarity, the more 
complex issues around the coercion and domination of the market on individual identity, 
particularly in choosing self-precarisation and how that undermines or reinforces freedom, 
 
3 Michel Foucault passed away in June 1984, as such his theories on biopolitics were still in the formative 
stages. Current literature on Foucault’s biopolitics are based predominately on a series of lectures he gave at 
the College Du France, when neoliberalism was still at the early stages of implementation. 
4 I disucss Foucualt’s Biopolitics and Lorey’s theory of precarisation more extensively in the conceptual 
framework and Chapter one. 
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are often overlooked. The discursive nature of a definition of freedom coupled with 
Foucault’s genealogical account of the development of liberal freedom, pave the way for an 
analysis of how a different concept of freedom could contest precarity. While the literature 
on freedom is vast, and easily exceeds the scope this thesis, I have sought to focus on the 
specific dynamics of freedom within precarity. As such the larger philosophical debates on 
freedom are not discussed.  However, as an opposing narrative of freedom as articulated by 
Hannah Arendt in her essay What is Freedom? (1961) is debated.  
 
The Politics of Precarity 
Pierre Bourdieu’s (1998) Acts of Resistance; Against the New Myths of Our Time, Guy Standing 
(2017) The Precariat: A Dangerous New Class and Judith Butler’s Precarious Life: The Powers of 
Mourning and Violence (2006) are all key texts that are consistently referenced by other 
theorists writing on precarity (Allison, 2012; Berlant, 2011; Ettlinger, 2007; Lorey, 2015; 
Millar, 2017; Munck, 2013; Neilson & Rossiter, 2005; Trott, 2013).  Not only do these key 
texts define precarity differently, they differ over who is precarious, why they are precarious 
and what the solutions should be (Millar, 2017). There is, however, an increasing number 
of scholars who have sought to bridge the divide between an understanding of precarity as 
a labour condition and as an ontological experience. These academics ground their theories 
in specific labour conditions and political-economic structures, while also considering how 
these conditions affect individual’s subjectivity, lived experience and psychological 
interiority (Allison, 2012; Berlant, 2011; Lorey, 2015). 
Pierre Bourdieu’s speech on precarity is widely accepted as recognising the current 
moment of precarity. In his speech Bourdieu critiques the rise of temporary, part-time and 
casualised work in France, linking the term precarity with insecure labour conditions. The 
EuroMayDay protests in the early 2000’s, although initially protesting against neoliberalism 
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and globalisation, mobilised around the identity of the precariato as a consequence of 
neoliberal and global polices (Millar, 2017), thereby lending a political aspect to analysis on 
precarity (Castel, 2003, 2016; Kalleberg, 2011; Lorey 2015; Sario, 2007; Standing, 2017). 
This literature focusses primarily on the changing relationship between capital and labour 
often by conceptualising power dynamics between the two. Precarious workers are either 
universalised as a homogenous group (Castel, 2002, 2016; Kalleberg, 2011) or theorists 
focus on specific precarious groups i.e. Betti (2016) and Vosko (2000,) both approach 
precarity through a feminist lens, while Connor (2015), examines the effect of the Hobbit 
law on film employees in Aotearoa New Zealand and Pothe et al (2010),  explores 
immigrant workers in Spain. The current climate of an increasing normalisation of insecure 
work is often contrasted with the previous Fordist era of secure employment, frequently 
with a nostalgic view. Freedom is often conflated with secure employment, with precarity 
associated with a degradation in freedom and citizenship rights. The exceptions to this are 
academics exploring gendered and/or immigration and precarity, where it is increasingly 
acknowledged that these groups were over-represented in precarious employment under 
Fordist conditions. Solutions are predominantly argued as a new social contract with 
universalised security.  
Standing’s The Precariat: A New Dangerous Class also follows Bourdieu’s analysis of 
capital versus labour power relations, however, he does take the argument in a slightly 
different direction by conceptualising a new class. In this way Standing and other theorists 
(Munck, 2013; Neilson & Rossiter, 2005) bring precarity into a socio-economic category 
arguably identifying a new underclass, which lacks not only insecure work but social and 
political rights and connections.  Although Standing creates a class (the precariat) that 
includes different groups of people such as migrants, university graduates and creative 
workers, reflecting a more nuanced understanding of who is precarious, his argument is 
often androcentric, still very much based on Fordist notions of security and freedom built 
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around a male breadwinner. He promotes a call to action by the precariat towards capital 
demanding a new compact with capital offering the threat of social dissolution if, what he 
terms, a revolutionary precariat’s demands are not met. Both Standing and Bourdieu’s 
arguments acknowledge the effects of structural changes, grounding their debate in 
empirical contexts which trace specific policy and economic changes, while examining the 
wider impacts of globalisation on the power dynamics between labour and capital. 
Ultimately these neoliberal changes have led to a loss of worker’s rights, a degradation of 
social safety nets and an overall stagnation of wages for the middle and lower class 
(Bourdieu, 1998; Castel, 2002; Munck, 2013; Moisander, et al, 2018; Munck, 2013; 
Standing, 2009, 2017). 
This literature often downplays or ignores precarious labour conditions that existed 
in the Fordist era (Betti, 2016, 2018; Lorey, 2015; Millar, 2017) instead promoting a 
perception of universalised security under Fordism. Theorists who challenge this 
understanding, often portray a Fordist era that offered security to a core group of citizens, 
acquired at the cost of insecurity for others, mostly marginalised groups (Betti, 2018; Lorey, 
2015; May, 1982). This interpretation also reflects a very Western view of precarity, 
ignoring that precarity has always been the norm for most of the non-Western world 
(Munck, 2013; Neilson et al. 2008). This literature generally understands the Fordist era 
from 1940s-1980s as the new normal, which neoliberal policies have disrupted, rather than 
contrasting literature (Munck, 2013; Neilson & Rossiter, 2008) which often views the 
Fordist era as unusually secure and outside the norms of a wider history of precarious 
work. Munck (2013) and Wright (2015) contest Standing’s Marxist definition of the 
precariat being a class in the making (Standing, 2017, p. 8). They point out that the 
precariat does not alter the relations of production in contemporary capitalism, nor are its 
material interests oppositional to those of the working class, therefore it does not fill the 
requirements necessary to exist as a class. Rather, as Wright explains, they regard it as “a 
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rapidly growing segment of the working class and the bearer of the sharpest grievances 
against capitalism” (Wright, 2015, p. 173).  Hardt & Negri (2011) and Munck (2013) further 
this conception by maintaining a global working class, as a class that has and will continue 
to remake itself. Thus reflecting in contemporary global conditions, a working class that is 
increasingly complex and multitudinal, contrasting with Standing’s Eurocentric precariat 
and Fordist constructions of the working class. Others contest Standing’s inclusion and 
exclusion of members of the precariat, (Lorey, 2015; Rossiter, 2005; Wright, 2015) and the 
revolutionary nature of the precariat (Han, 2018; Munck, 2013; Rossiter et al, 2005, 2008; 
Jorgensen, 2015). As this literature generally links freedom with secure work and wider 
citizenship rights, the solution to precarity is presented as a reassertion of freedom through 
class solidarity and protest and updating the industrial age compact between capital and the 
workers. However, as freedom is not a primary focus, issues such as self-precarisation as an 
example of freedom or exploitation are deftly side-stepped. 
Judith Butler’s book Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (2004) is an 
influential text which examines precariousness in a more philosophical context. Her 
definition of precariousness is quoted and acknowledged by both strands of thought, 
(precarity and precariousness), although her exploration of precariousness is within a much 
broader context and as something distinct and separate from precarity. As such Butler 
looks at precariousness as an existential human vulnerability, something that is fundamental 
to all human existence and something that we all share. From this perspective she explores 
the different ways in which individuals act to secure life, arguing that our very 
interdependability and relationality to one another is the foundation for our freedom. In 
this way Butler is highlighting the unequal and unethical distribution of resources needed to 
sustain the  life of some,  at the expense of others.  Butler’s analysis in often ground in the 
physicality of human bodies, connecting our universal physical vulnerability and our 
necessary survival, arguing that this is dependent on others. This analysis has opened up 
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the academic framework for precarity, by relating physical vulnerability to emotional and 
mental insecurity, resulting in an increasing use of precarity being used as a synonym for 
vulnerability. Millar (2017) argues that this expanding use of the term precarity may degrade 
its analytical value as a framework for understanding specific labour conditions as it is 
increasingly used to describe any vulnerability. Butler herself uses precariousness as a basis 
to understand America’s response to 9/11 and ongoing US policies designed to legitimise 
war, thereby extending precarity beyond labour conditions to highlight broader power 
dynamics which designate some lives as more livable. Butler does state that “Lives are 
supported and maintained differently, and there are radically different ways in which 
human physical vulnerability is distributed across the globe” (Butler, 2004. p. 32) 
acknowledging the unequal distribution of precarity as a physical vulnerability. Gilson 
(2013), however argues that Butler relies on equality as an ethical ideal to challenge the 
legitimacy of precarity, thereby relying on normative liberal assumptions. 
Increasingly there are theorists who are exploring both precarity as insecure work 
and an unequal distribution of security across society, as well as precariousness as an 
ontological reality that commonly forms bonds of interdependence across all levels of 
society (Allison, 2011; Berlant, 2011; Lorey, 2015; Mole, 2010; Neilson & Rossiter, 2008). 
Millar (2017) states that this group of theorists are particularly useful in their analysis 
because they look at precarity both as a socio-economic condition and an ontological 
experience, thereby linking political economy with questions of culture, subjectivity and 
experience. Each of these authors discusses precarity in slightly different ways, Allison 
(2011,) looks at how youth unemployment creates everyday temporalities disrupting long 
term plans, Berlant (2011), discusses how precarious work degrades normative middle-class 
expectations of the good life, Mole (2010), examines how the loss of labour protections 
generates psychic and affective states of anxiety and  Lorey (2015), looks at precarisation as 
a governmental rationality designed to secure citizens compliance. Within this framework, 
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Lorey explores themes of freedom, sovereignty and gender. Ultimately Lorey’s 
understanding of precarity as a technique of governing which normalises insecurity and 
induces individuals to be responsible for their own precariousness, inversely provides sites 
for resistance and change precisely because the self is empowered.  
While the literature on precarity is diverse and often contested, there are some areas 
of accord. These are mostly concerning the different definitions of precariousness, 
precarity and precarisation. Although insecure work was the initial foundation for 
understanding precarity, further analysis by academics has resulted in an interpretation of 
precarity that includes insecure work but also extends beyond to acknowledge the wider 
implications of unequal access to the resources required to make a life livable and the 
inherent precariousness of life. While this widens the analytical framework for precarity, it 
allows for further analysis and research into affective social and cultural demarcations 
which legitimise capitalist exploitation of racial and gendered segments of the population. 
Often freedom is implicitly examined within this literature, however a more in-depth 
investigation of how a narrative of freedom acts conversely to legitimise precarity while 









My conceptual framework examines Michel Foucault’s biopolitics and governmentality 
theory. His theories form the basis of Isabell Lorey’s concept of precarisation and are often 
implicit in her examination of freedom and power in precarity. Both Lorey and Foucault 
offer a complex understanding of the ambivalent nature of freedom that underlies both 
resistance and domination to precarity and is the foundation for this thesis. While Foucault 
never directly addresses precarity, his analysis of the technologies of governance seem to 
naturally offer a distinctive understanding of the present precarious moment. It is this 
distinctive perspective that Lorey further updates and elaborates. 
  In a modern environment Foucault’s analysis of power dynamics provides a 
framework to comprehend how technologies of governance use freedom and precarity as 
tools of coercion.   Additionally, his analysis can be used to explore precarity and freedom 
as an impetus for resistance to neoliberal market narratives. Foucault’s work is extensive 
and covers many areas, however, in this conceptual framework I will concentrate on a few 
key ideas relevant to the focus of this thesis. In particular, Foucault’s exploration of 
freedom as crucial to compel specific actions as part of a hegemonic narrative and 
paradoxically as a potential site to ultimately challenge those same dominant discourses. 
Also, the creation of disciplinary norms, which act as modes of subjectification, subjecting 
individuals to preconceived ideals of acceptable and desirable conduct. Furthermore, 
Foucault explores the association between the individual body as property and the 
population as a larger body which needs administering. As Foucault largely highlights the 
coercive and controlling nature of biopolitical governance, the acknowledgement of the 
freedom of the individual to resist those narratives can seem somewhat theoretical. While 
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Foucault focusses on the dominant narrative of neoliberalism and the power of that 
narrative to form individual identities, he does tend to ignore other narratives that co-exist 
in social and political spaces and which provide other opportunities for modulating 
individual identity.  
Michel Foucault’s analysis of power in modern liberal societies represented a break 
from traditional political investigations into power. Customarily the model of political 
power was focussed on the state as a centralised body, imagining human beings as subjects 
to that power. Individuals were often considered autonomous and self-possessed, political 
subjects of right, will and agency (Rose, 1999). In this context freedom was often defined 
in negative terms, as the absence of coercion or domination. Foucault challenged these 
ideas arguing that liberal forms of governance were based on the influencing and coercing 
of individuals to legitimise specific actions and behaviours (Dean, 2013; Foucault, 1982, 
2007, 2008; Lemke, 2011; Rose, 1999). He maintained that power was not centralised in the 
state, but that governance existed both at the macro and micro levels of society. Dean 
(2013) reinforces this point when he states, “Foucault’s analysis of power is not placed on 
the conventional terrain of inequality, legitimacy and social transformation, but on identity, 
technique and what we will call the government of self and other” (p. 43). Thus, Foucault’s 
biopolitics analyses technologies of the self and techniques of domination in late capitalism, 
through technologies of regulation, surveillance and normalisation.  
Foucault identified two main actions of the state, which reflected a historical shift 
in governing. One he termed biopolitics, which represented a changing focus of 
governance and the other he called governmental rationalities or governmentality. He also 
identified two specific focuses for governing, firstly at the individual level of physical 
bodies, and secondly at a collectivised body of the population. 
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Foucault’s biopolitics reflected an understanding of life as the focus of politics. Lemke 
(2011) states “biopolitics stands for the constellation in which modern humans and natural 
sciences and the normative concepts that emerge from them, structure political action and 
determine its goals” (p. 33).  Foucault’s genealogical style of analysis indicated how over 
time, a single sovereign ruling a population for his/her own enrichment had 
metamorphosed into a liberal government. This liberal government arguably governed the 
population for the ultimate betterment and enrichment of the population5.  Foucault 
spends a great deal of time tracing the origins of biopolitics in order to understand how 
power in a liberal society is dispersed.   He recognised in pastoral power, or the power of 
the church, a discursive structure that convinced and cajoled their congregations into living 
a better life for their own salvation. It was this procedure of governing that the church had 
successfully adopted that Foucault recognised in an emerging liberal state. This procedure 
for organising a population, consisted of totalising the overall ambition of the group 
towards a preconceived ideal of a perfect member of the congregation. This collective goal 
then depended on each individual complying and striving towards that ideal. The ultimate 
overall success of the group was then dependant on the individual actions of each member 
within that group. Foucault understood the power inherent in collective peer pressure to 
comply, imposed on individuals within the group. He also recognised power that was 
embedded in a hierarchical social system, with knowledge supposedly secured at the 
echelons of the congregation, limited to those who were qualified to interpret Gods will. 
The transfer of this procedure to a liberal government meant that power was both 
centralised and dispersed, with populations being viewed as both totalising and 
 
5 Foucault was highlighting here a change in the focus and legitimacy of governing away from a single 
monarch, instead to a government of the people for the people. Whether this actually became the case is very 
much disputed and discussed among academics. However, Foucault was not claiming that this genealogical 
change categorically happened, only that a previously dominant narrative in which the needs of a single 
sovereign were ascendant had moved to a narrative in which governmental action was legitimised based on 
the premise that it was representing the national needs.  
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individualised. The creation of an ideal member of the congregation, a prescribed norm of 
behaviour, and the exclusion of those who failed to measure up, coupled with the denial of 
access to a promised salvation, emphasise the coercive subjective nature of this procedure 
of governance.  
Pastoral power formed the basis for a process of liberal governing and reflected the 
new biopolitical form of administration, which has legitimised neoliberal discourses. Like 
pastoral power, neoliberalism offers a form of redemption, however that redemption is 
based in this world, rather than the next. Foucault writes that “health, wellbeing security 
and protection become forms of salvation” (Foucault, 1982, p. 784) stressing how these 
things came to reflect the success of neoliberal subjects.  This new form of rule by the 
state, Foucault saw as an extension of pastoral power, power which he understood to 
construct its own form of truth, coextensive and continuous with life (Foucault, 1982). As 
biopolitics acts to individualise each member of the population, while also viewing the 
populace as a single organic body, the state can then act with a sense of legitimacy in 
demarcating sections of the population to securitise, while simultaneously isolating and 
precaritising segments of that same population which are characterised as outside 
preconceived norms.  
If biopolitics represents the focus on living bodies and the processes of life as 
political legitimacy, then governmentality represents the assemblages of knowledge 
designed to coerce and convince individuals to comply with accepted norms (Foucault, 
2004). Governmentalities or governmental rationalities are the narratives/discourses that 
represent distinctive forms of knowledge, espoused by experts, which under a liberal 
government has resulted in a privileging of political economy and the market as a site for 
truth and freedom. By analysing the changing characteristics and definition of norms, 
Foucault problematised the constructed nature of accepted patterns of behaviour, that at 
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each period in time, have generally become accepted as natural. Foucault termed this the 
“operation of disciplinary normalisation” (Foucault, 2004, p. 57). This process was based 
on the categorisation, data collection and focus on the improvement of the life expectancy 
and productivity of the population. This accumulation of knowledge and expert analysis 
created models of conduct which differentiated between behaviours that were normal 
and/or desirable and those that were considered abnormal and/or undesirable.  
Disciplinary organisation then involved governmental rationalities designed to influence 
and convince individuals to comply with these prescribed norms for their own ultimate 
good. However, Foucault recognised that power was not just imposed from above but also 
productive at an individual level, resulting in an internalisation of norms which are then re-
enacted on others socially, politically and economically. For Foucault, the prescriptive 
nature of ‘the norm’ which then defined normal and abnormal definitions of behaviour and 
segments of the population, was the primary fundamental apparatus of biopolitics and 
governmentality 
Neoliberalism, as a governmental rationality, has created economic characteristics 
beyond the market into social, political and cultural spaces redefining norms and privileging 
a market identity (Brown, 2015; Moisander et al, 2018; Miller & Rose, 2008). Foucault 
recognised the pervasive nature of the language of neoliberalism and the power it held to 
reshape life.  Miller and Rose state that “Within this politico-ethical environment, the 
expertise of market research, of promotion and communication, provides the relays 
through which the aspirations of ministers, the ambitions of business and the dreams of 
consumers achieve mutual translatability” (2008, p. 25). Within a narrative of neoliberalism 
an ideal citizen acting and rationalising as an economic actor, then becomes a nautralised 
truth (Rose, 1999, pp. 8-9). Thus, an art of governance which was built around autonomy 
and freedom, exercised coercion and compliance at an individual level by naturalising 
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internal regulatory and disciplining actions, in effect self-governing. The internalisation of 
entrepreneurial6 codes of conduct emphasised individual success in the market as success 
within social and political arenas as well. Characteristics that enhanced market success were 
represented as highly desirable with competition at every level of life designed to further 
encourage adaptability and evolution. Brown (2015) states 
within neoliberal rationality, human capital is both our “is’ and our “ought”- what we are 
said to be, what we should be, and what the rationality makes us through its norms and 
construction of environments. . . all domains are markets, and we are everywhere 
presumed to be market actors. (p. 36) 
As individuals are encouraged to self-govern and self-regulate along internalised neoliberal 
ideologies, even those decisions which are seemingly freely made within a neoliberal 
context, can represent exploitative and unfree circumstances due to the hegemonic 
normative influence neoliberalism has. This raises a fundamental question within 
Foucauldian academia, how much autonomy does an individual possess when an ideology 
becomes internalised and normalised? 
From an accepted understanding of the norm grew a rationale for governing that 
legitimised itself. Foucault saw power exercised in the everyday way individuals modified 
themselves and those around them to the dominant paradigms. Specifically, Foucault talks 
about empowerment7 and subjectivity to explore the contradictory way biopower is utilised.  
 
6  Although entrepreneurial conduct can specifically relate to a work environment reflecting common 
characteristics of self-employed individuals, it is the promoting of those characteristics across all aspects of 
life that make it a disciplinary norm. Self-responsibility, self-regulation and risk-taking thus become 
characteristics that are prized in all areas of life, even in roles that would not be considered entrepreneurial. 
7 Although Foucault uses the term empowerment, Lorey uses the term sovereignty to denote the autonomous 
action of the self, on the self.  Foucault discusses sovereignty at length in his lectures (Foucault, 2004, pp. 88-
110) but usually in the context of the historical shift from a single monarch to the state. He does mention the 
sovereignty of the people (Foucault, 2004, p.73), but often in a context based on juridical rights, so he is 
never particularly clear that he understands sovereignty to mean the power of an individual to remake and 
form itself. Lorey however, does use the term sovereignty in exactly that way while quoting Foucault 
“Although Foucault sees this tension and even relates it to the new art of governmentality, he always remains 
bound up with rights (and their subjects), rather than being linked with imaginations of the capability for self-
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This is a paradox of the self-governing subject, or as Rousseau argues that all self-
governing citizens should also be subjects and sovereign at the same time (cited in Lorey, 
2015, p 32). Accordingly, this has resulted in individuals seemingly freely choosing to form 
identities around pre-conceived ideals of productive citizenship. This neoliberal self-
identification applies not only to those who are considered normal and productive, but 
equally to those who are labelled as existing outside productive citizenship. The effect of 
the redefinition of success as an individual enterprise, can undermine resistance to 
exploitative living conditions, as tolerance of risk is considered a desirable characteristic of 
success. Furthermore, it can influence individual identity to the extent that people choose 
precarious work situations as a reflection of their free lifestyle. Foucault (1982) reinforces 
this when he argues that neoliberalism as a new form of power creates sophisticated 
structures in which individuals can be integrated on the condition that this individuality is 
shaped into a new form and submitted to a set of very specific patterns (p. 783). The norm 
becomes not just an overriding concept of success and security, but a point of reference 
determining who is normal and what normal is, how far outside the norm others exist, in 
what ways are they less normal or even abnormal. Foucault understands this 
individualisation of identity as a form of power, as it often involves a normalisation of 
techniques of discipline to remake a body in a manner deemed more productive. He even 
defines a specific form of power as “that which ties an individual to himself and submits 
him to others in this way (struggles against subjection, against forms of subjectivity and 
submission)” (Foucault, 1982, p. 781).   
The recognition of an individual’s body as a form of property ownership, easily 
translates across both a totalising and individualistic governance (Butler, 2018; Lemke, 
2011; Lorey 2009, 2015). The maximisation of one’s health and well-being also becomes 
 
creation, coherence and autonomy as condition and effect of biopolitical governmentality” (Lorey, 2015, p. 
24) 
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fused with the development of skills and talents to mould a body into a productive life 
force. The site of the individual body then becomes a potential site for wealth.  Collectively 
the populations health therefore directly impacts the overall productivity of the nation. 
Lemke (2011) recognises this dual aspect of Foucault’s biopolitics, the regulation of the 
population and the disciplining of the individual body, not as two separate extremes but as 
“two sides of a global political technology that simultaneously aims at the control of the 
human as individual body and at the human as species” (p. 38). As such the disciplining of 
the individual presupposes a multiplicity, although a multiplicity is an often taken for 
granted concept within neoliberalism.  
Lemke regards Foucault’s biopolitics as focussed on achieving an overall 
equilibrium of the population by protecting the security of the whole from internal dangers 
(p. 37). By viewing the population as a biological organism possibly similar to Hobbes 
Leviathan, the state can analyse individual sections which may become problems to the 
overall body and develop ways to neutralise those effects. This logic underpins Foucault’s 
discourse on racism and class division, contextualising these social discourses as biological 
fissures which naturally fragment certain segments of society away from a universalising 
narrative of the population as a homogenous healthy whole. This allows for and justifies, in 
the pursuit of biological purity, a hierarchisation of those who are worthy to live and others 
who are considered worth less. As such normalisation of racial differences and ideas 
becomes more powerful than is objectively right, in fact what is right shifts to fit within 
ideas of what is normal. Foucault’s analysis here is very limited and focussed only on 
racism and class division, however precarious work as a form of control and 
marginalisation reflects Foucault’s ideas of perceived threats from within encouraging more 
easily governable subjects. Conversely this narrative justifies the exploitation of vulnerable 
groups, for the overall health of the economy and therefore the population.  
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Freedom plays a central role in Foucault’s theories of governance. To govern is to 
recognise the capacity for action and the ability to adjust others and oneself to act in 
desirable ways. To govern then, is not to crush the capacity to act, but to acknowledge and 
utilise it. In this respect governance is built on the presupposition of the freedom of the 
governed. Foucault specifically focussed on the technologies that governing authorities 
employ in order to coerce and utilise individuals’ actions and the way that self-governance 
entrenches those technologies, offering them legitimacy. Governance in this context does 
not refer only to the state, indeed the state is just one example of what Rose refers to as” 
multiple circuits of power connecting a diversity of authorities and forces, within a whole 
variety of complex assemblages” (1999, p.5). What is governing society at a macro level, 
ultimately promoting a specific conduct via prisons, schools, hospitals, clinics, bedrooms, 
factories, offices, the market, shopping malls,  intersects with techniques for the 
administration of individuals at a micro level. These techniques refer to all endeavours to 
shape, guide, and direct the conduct of others, from the population of a nation to be good 
citizens, to the members of a household. It also embraces the ways in which an individual 
is educated and encouraged to control and govern oneself. At the centre of these 
technologies is freedom: itself a constructed narrative which frames specific justifications 
of coercive behaviour. For example, that the constraint of the few is necessary for the 
freedom of the many, or that coercion is required to eliminate dependency enforcing self-
sufficiency (Rose, 1999).  
Foucault recognised two distinct discourses of freedom; one ground in the 
marketplace of neoliberalism and the other at the site of the individual’s subjectification to 
neoliberal norms. He argued that neoliberalism had developed a complex new relationship 
with freedom, that it both consumed and produced freedom, organised and administered it 
(Foucault, 2004, pp. 63-65). Masquelier (2018) notes  
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Under this reading, satisfaction is said to presuppose freedom, namely the freedom to 
choose. But like risk and responsibility, satisfaction is individualized. Individuals have 
effectively become personally responsible for choosing their own desires and securing the 
means for realizing them.  (p .4).  
Freedom then becomes conflated with the freedom to choose one’s own satisfaction.  This 
particular understanding of freedom therefore justifies the free market, which becomes the 
place in which freedom is produced and consumed and satisfaction is self-responsibilised.   
  Foucault also stresses how security is used to reinforce freedom, as if the two were 
mutually intertwined. The drive for security, Foucault argues, reveals a culture of danger at 
the heart of neoliberalism. An underlying fear built on a sense of insecurity. This insecurity 
encourages competition and risk, reinforcing an entrepreneurial character acting freely 
within a market environment to secure his/her own success.  Masquelier (2018) argues that 
this paradox between freedom and a culture of danger, encourages individuals to constantly 
exert their freedom to adjust to changing market environments. Freedom then, more 
narrowly becomes the freedom to adjust, underlining how freedom itself has become an 
instrument of subjection to an established order (p. 4). In this way precarity can be 
understood both as part of a culture of danger reinforcing a wider sense of insecurity, while 
simultaneously being promoted as the definitive expression of freedom. 
Conversely, Foucault explores resistance and the practices of freedom which are 
dependent on the coercive and persuasive nature of biopolitics. At the individual site of 
subjugation, where the pressure to conform to pre-approved conducts is exerted on 
individuals by both macro and micro level forms of governance, there always exists the 
potential for refusal. Foucault understood these counter narratives as opposition to the 
processes of power that sought to regulate and control life (Lemke, 2011, p. 50). As such 
they seek to articulate new identities and new forms of life which contest existing ones. 
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This is not necessarily an exodus from power relations itself, as Foucault would argue that 
is not possible, rather these new counter conducts have the capacity to become hegemonic 
themselves. Foucauldian theorists following this line of resistance would then seek to argue 
for a refusal of entrepreneurial identities that create competitive and individualistic forms 
of life, entrenching neoliberal inequality (Brown, 2015; Butler, 2015; Lorey, 2015). 
However, Foucault’s theory of resistance is often quite generalised, presupposing a binary 
response as opposition. As such he fails to explore the complexity of human identity, 
autonomy and interaction and the diversity of counter narratives that co-exist together at 
any singular moment.  
Foucault articulates neoliberal identity as absolute. As the focus of his 
understanding of power is based on how hegemonic ideologies, in particular neoliberalism, 
undermine freedom, there is little analysis of the often contradictory and arbitrary adoption 
of neoliberal qualities. At times this creates a sense of complete dominance of the human 
identity by neoliberalism, which then makes it difficult to conceive of any form of 
resistance or opposition. Foucault does argue that as any ideology becomes dominant so 
the potential for resistance to that domination increases. However, this fails to explain the 
adaptive nature of neoliberalism and the different strands that developed in different 
countries (Harvey, 2007). The space between complete domination of neoliberal ideologies 
and the formation of counter conducts as resistance, tends to ignore the diversity of 
discourses that exist, in particular how neoliberal rhetoric often sits side by side with 
contesting narratives. For example, the highly individualistic focus of neoliberalism is 
nested within a societal context which is built on interdependency. Consequently, theorists 
have sought to utilise a Foucauldian discourse analysis to further explore resistance and 
refusals at the site of subjectification as a foundation for more complex resistance theories 
(Brown, 2015; Butler, 2015; Hardt & Negri, 2001; Lemke, 2011; Lorey, 2015; Rose, 1999). 
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Isabell Lorey on Governmentality and Precarity. 
Isabell Lorey deepens Foucault’s analysis of liberal forms of governance and updates his 
theoretical framework to reflect aspects of neoliberalism and governmentality that frame 
and recreate precariousness. Although Lorey does extend her examination on precarity 
particularly when exploring opportunities for resistance, by building on other academics’ 
theories such as Virno, Butler, Arendt and Deleuze & Guattari, her central concept of 
precarisation as a process of governing is predominantly Foucauldian. She defines 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality as designating “the structural entanglement between 
the government of the state and the techniques of self-government in modern Western 
societies” (2015, p. 23). Lorey then argues the power of governmentality lies in the state’s 
ability to normalise certain practices, such as precarity, which leads to self-governing habits 
of the population along conducts created and encouraged by the state and by capital. In 
this way Lorey explores the narrative underlining precarisation, that the state and capital 
use to more easily govern the population. Lorey also understands precarity as more than 
insecure jobs, rather as embracing the whole of existence, the body and modes of 
subjectification (2015, p. 1). In the following chapter I discuss Lorey’s theory of 











Precarisation as a Governmental Process 
This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorises the 
individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a 
law of truth on him which he must recognise, and which others must recognise in him. It is 
a form of power that makes individuals subjects. (Foucault, 1982, p. 781) 
 
If as Lorey asserts, precarisation is a deliberate process of governing populations, then 
precarisation at its core must fundamentally question commonly accepted liberal assertions 
of freedom. As a technique of governing, precarisation by its very definition coerces, 
convinces and influences individuals, thereby shaping the decisions individuals make to live 
and thrive within social and political structures. Acting as a framework, which ostensibly 
endorses a certain conduct, the strength of precarisation as a governmental narrative is the 
way in which it normalises and internalises certain discourses as natural. Lorey (2010), 
argues that precarisation is not a phenomena that began with marginalised groups before 
spreading into the centre and eventually infecting the middle classes. This construction of 
precarity, she argues, ignores the remodelling and outright dismantling of social security 
systems, the massive reduction in permanent employment contracts, the increase in 
temporary jobs often demanding a high degree of mobility, with or without social security 
benefits such as paid sick leave and holidays (p. 3). Rather these changes can be understood 
as a neoliberal instrument of governance. As a way of governing internally through social 
insecurity, while offering the minimum of social security.  
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These deliberate processes influence individual identity and social 
relations/expectations, becoming constitutive in creating a self-fulfilling reality, making 
invisible specific actions and practices which support and entrench unequal access to the 
resources which make a life livable. As such freedom in a precarious context is situated 
within a very specific market environment, which frames an individual’s sense of empirical 
reality and autonomy. The freedom to work in the gig economy, or to be an independent 
contractor, or even a dependant self-employed person for example, exposes a very narrow 
understanding of freedom, situated in insecure employment, framed by an optimistic 
narrative that valorises an entrepreneurial character (McGovern, 2017). This is the crux of 
precarisation for Lorey, the paradoxical way it uses freedom to legitimise a narrative of self-
discipline and self-responsibility, while deliberately entrenching inequality through 
economic, social and political governmentalities and actions, thereby ultimately limiting 
freedom for increasing proportions of the population. As such her analysis of the 
exploitation of what she terms cultural producers and self-precarisation exposes the 
contradiction of the neoliberal claim of freedom existing within precarious work.  
In this chapter I explore Lorey’s theory of precarisation.  Lorey problematises the 
discursive structures which determine and justify precarity. Her examination of the 
ambivalent manner with which freedom is used to promote precarisation, remains largely 
under theorised in other explorations of precarity and freedom such as Bourdieu, Standing 
and Castel. In this respect, Lorey’s theory of precarisation is an original thesis for 
understanding precarity as a new form of power and potential for exploitation.  However, 
both Foucault and Lorey at times offer an understanding of resistance as dichotomous, 
exhibiting either a hegemonic narrative that is panoptic in nature, or counter narratives that 
rise in opposition, challenging dominant discourses and ultimately becoming hegemonic 
themselves. Academics such as Berlant explore the complexity of resistance and 
compliance within post-Fordist capitalist societies, offering a more nuanced approach. This 
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offers a different perspective on the influence precarity can have on entrenching inequality 
and undermining resistance, which I believe is valuable. Predominantly however, this 
chapter builds on the Foucauldian basis of Lorey’s concepts and further develops Lorey’s 
theory of precarisation and the role freedom performs within it. In her analysis of the 
changing dynamic of a narrative of freedom, Lorey often compares aspects of a previous 
economic era she commonly refers to as a Fordist era, with a contemporary neoliberal one. 
For this reason, I will begin this chapter with an explanation of Fordism.   
 
Fordism 
Within precarity literature, the Fordist era is commonly referred to as a period of time 
between the 1940s and the 1980s. This era normatively represented within western 
countries, a standard employment relationship that was secure and longstanding. This 
period is often situated in opposition to a post-Fordist and/or neoliberal period, from the 
1980s onwards, in which this standard employment relationship is considered to be 
increasingly under threat (Betti, 2016; Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007). Fordism was initially a 
term used to describe the introduction of Henry Ford’s production line, which specialised 
workers roles and was capable of a high industrial productivity.  At the time this specialised 
repetitive work under a highly hierarchised system, which considered workers parts of a 
machine, was criticised as exploitative.  However, May (1982) argues that it was Ford’s later 
introduction of a family wage for his workers, combined with secure long term 
employment that consolidated a social contract between capital, the state and workers, 
which has come to typify the Fordist era. Ford’s family wage normalised a male 
breadwinner, financially supporting his family, while women’s roles became associated with 
unpaid reproductive work in the home (Betti, 2016; May, 1982). It was this gendered 
division of roles which classified female work as insecure and temporary, built on an 
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understanding of a women’s priorities revolving around care of the family, with the income 
they earned outside the home considered supplemental to a male wage (Betti, 2016, p. 68). 
As such, women’s job security was heavily affected by societal expectations, with certain 
job structures seemingly more appropriate for women, for example part-time work and 
temporary contracts. At the same time unregulated labour (considered part of the informal 
economy which consisted of care services and industrial homework), which was frequently 
highly gendered and insecure, was often discounted or ignored in consensus gathering. The 
Italian National Institute of Statistics, for example, estimated that from the 1950s onwards 
over one million adult women workers vanished from the labour market.  Paid 
employment outside the home was dependant on intersectionality’s of class and race while 
marriage8 and pregnancy often affected employment longevity and advancement (Betti, 
2016, 2018; Vosko, 2000). While these jobs offered financial reward, and sometimes limited 
security, they did not offer financial independence. Although these conditions existed 
before the Fordist era, their continuation during Fordism challenges the assertion that the 
Fordist era offered universal security. As Fordism spread from America throughout the 
western world it became associated with the expansion of Keynesian economic theory 
which, represented a stable welfare system, high employment rates and economic security 
(Nielson & Rossiter, 2008).   
During the Fordist era, freedom was commonly connected with the idea of secure 
employment. Conversely during a post-Fordist era, the loss of secure employment is 
frequently associated with a loss of freedom (Bourdieu, 1998; Castel, 2002; Standing, 2016). 
However, there is much debate concerning the universal assertion of employment security 
during Fordism, with many theorists arguing that during this time not only women but also 
migrants and minority groups disproportionally experienced precarious employment (Betti, 
 
8 Betti (2016) higlights the use of spinster clauses commonly used among Italian employers during the Fordist 
era  to compel women to resign from their employment once they were married. A law was passed in 1963 
outlawing such clauses (p. 71) 
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2016, 2018; May, 1982). While Fordist employment relations, are often positioned as the 
norm and post-Fordist insecure employment as the exception, other academics argue that 
precarious work has always been the norm, both historically and geographically with 
Fordist secure work existing as the global exception (Lorey, 2015; Munck, 2013; Nielson & 
Rossiter, 2005, 2008,). 
Over the course of this thesis I will use the term Fordist to represent the social, 
political and economic era represented by secure work conditions for specific segments of 
society, underpinned by a social welfare state. I use both post-Fordist and neoliberalism 
interchangeably to recognise the rise of insecure work, the degradation of workers rights 
and the loss of social welfare safety nets. I also use the term neoliberalism to refer to 
narratives which normalise individuals as self-responsibilising, entrepreneurial units of 
market activity. 
 
Lorey’s theory of precarisation 
While Lorey explores the wider social, economic and political constructions and 
consequences of precarity, she particularly challenges the idea that choosing precarious 
work is an expression of freedom and independence. In order to verify her argument, 
Lorey exposes governmental narratives and biopolitical dynamics, which structure 
normalised hegemonic ideas of autonomy and freedom, both at an individual level and at a 
population locus. In doing so, Lorey lays out her thesis for precarisation as a governmental 
process. Lorey’s argument is very complex, centred as it is on an understanding of an 
individual acting autonomously and free, when in fact they are not.  
At the centre of this complex understanding of freedom, is a recognised 
paradoxical tension between self-sovereignty, or sovereignty of the people and domination 
of the people. Lorey highlights this when she states, “The essence of the political body 
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consists in the concurrence of obedience and freedom” (Lorey, 2015, p. 32). For Lorey this 
subjugation/empowerment dynamic is central to understanding self-precarisation. Lorey 
argues that the idea of two opposing modes of behaviour or frameworks of existence 
within democratic liberal societies is often seen as paradoxical, when in fact it is ambivalent. 
In this way citizens are expected to adjust themselves, to control their bodies, their lives 
and their relationships with others, in ways that are considered appropriate. Empowerment 
over one’s own body and life is constrained within frameworks of subjectivation based on a 
collective acknowledgement of correct conduct. However, there is freedom to act, the very 
act of self-regulation depends on an individual’s tacit acceptance of the conduct of conduct 
the state compels. This ability for people to accept and act constitutively in ways that seem  
inherently oppositional, even self-exploitative, is for Lorey linked to the imagination of the 
capability for self-creation and autonomy of Foucault’s biopolitical governmental 
subjectivation. 
Lorey (2015) argues that freedom in a liberal government is based on an enfolding 
dynamic of securisation and autonomy of the population. However, the co-existence of 
both freedom and security, within a socio-political framework prevents the absoluteness of 
either. As such liberal freedom can only exist within a structure of security, security can 
only be enforced where a belief in autonomous action exists (Lorey, 2015, p. 37) As not 
everyone can be secure and/or free this discourse creates a hierarchy of citizens with those 
considered more entitled situated in a safe centre, those less desirable pushed out to the 
unsafe margins. The legitimation of security then often rests on the fear of being 
considered outside or on the margins of accepted ideas of citizenship, based predominantly 
on the “free sovereign- bourgeois white subject with his concomitant property relation” 
(Lorey, 2015, p. 36).  This normalisation of beliefs of sovereign citizenship then reinforces 
structures of inequality. The fear of becoming precaritised induces conformity and 
compliance to pre-existing structures of domination. Lorey (2015) states “In this sense I 
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use precarity as a structural category of ordering segmented relations of violence and 
inequality. This dimension of structural inequality, however, is missing in Foucault’s 
conception of governmentality” (p. 38).  The self-regulating structures of freedom and 
security then depend on a hierarchy of inequality and precarity as sources of fear and 
danger reinforcing contradictions between self-empowerment and compulsion.  
 
Biopolitical Immunisation 
Lorey’s biopolitical immunisation is an examination into how some bodies are categorised 
as more worthy of a livable life, while others are marginalised and made vulnerable.  A 
biopolitical immunisation theory of the population conceives of a freedom/ security 
dynamic as central to the social bargain between the state, capital and labour, however this 
bargain both includes and excludes individuals.  Within this context the buy in from 
individuals to a capitalist hegemony is rewarded by security and freedom, in reality this was 
only true for a core segment of the population. During the Fordist era this secure core 
which existed predominantly in western societies, was largely comprised of white males 
who were valued as idealised, healthy productive workers (Lorey, 2015, p. 30). Society was 
built on an understanding of the male breadwinner and the patriarchal protector of his 
family. The feminised private sphere coalescing around a male protector was mirrored by 
the social and political sphere, which was built around the privileged position of the white 
male individual.  
This system of hierarchical patriarchy created a belief in social security, immunising 
the population against precarity. However, this security was not equally available to 
everyone.  As such precarity was based not on merit or choice, but primarily on racial or 
gender identity (Betti, 2016; Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007; Butler, 2016; Lorey, 2015). 
Insecure or precarious workers were thus excluded and identified as abnormal, existing 
- 45 - 
 
outside normal societal employment relations, thereby justifying their precarity. The 
insecurity of the abnormal others ensured the security of the core population, the overall 
security and success of the state is interrelated with the continued security and success of 
the staple core. Those in precarious work were considered the necessary sacrifice for the 
continued overall wealth and health of everyone else. As those on the margins are typified 
as deviant, unhealthy, and undeserving, involving a process of dehumanising and othering, 
their precariousness as such is accepted as legitimate (Lorey, 2015, pp 36-39). 
 Interestingly, under a neoliberal post-Fordist economic system, this biopolitical 
immunisation discourse sits alongside a neoliberal entrepreneurial valorisation of risk-
taking and self-precarisation, resulting in an increasing valorisation of precarious work. 
Arguably the first discourse seems to represent precarity as a lack of freedom, while the 
second discourse promotes precarity as freedom enhancing. This represents a fundamental 
shift in a Fordist definition of freedom based on security to a post-Fordist neoliberal 
definition of freedom based on insecurity. For Lorey both discourses represent a discipline 
of normalisation imposed from above and reconstituted across the population, therefore, 
neither form the basis for freedom. 
 Biopolitical immunisation also acts as a double threat motif, generating fear of 
losing secure employment and falling to the margins and as a threat via invasion by 
precarious others who would infect the secure core. As a threat motif precarity provides 
further motivation for individuals to comply with neoliberal commodification, ultimately 
making them more governable. Here Lorey acknowledges that precarious work coincides 
with an abstract anxiety over existential precariousness or the mental anxiousness of our 
physical vulnerability (Lorey, 2015, p. 88). This culture of danger undermines resistance to 
capitalist hegemony and typifies the modern post-Fordist neoliberal era. As precariousness 
infects an increasing part of the core population, individuals further strive towards self-
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discipline, in the belief that they are responsible for their own security, leading towards 
further competition, fragmentation and atomisation. In this way, precarisation acts to 
encourage compliance, leading to Berlant’s assertion of a ‘cruel optimism’ in which people 
continually manage their own expectations and insecurity (2011, pp. 14-15). 
The cognitive dissonance, that Berlant highlights, between the promise of 
neoliberal success and the reality of increasingly precarious work, stagnant wages and 
environmental calamity, generates not a resistance to neoliberalism but conversely a 
resistance to change itself. Rather cruel optimism entrenches patterns of behaviour which 
lead to managing the ongoing present rather than resisting it and developing  new counter 
conducts. The individual’s energy is expended on maintaining an ever decreasing area of 
security, renewing commitments to neoliberalism, despite a recognition that it is 
neoliberalism itself that is the cause of the insecurity. Berlant (2011) states,  
The internal tensions between capitalism and democracy seem resolved as long as a little 
voting, a little privacy, and unimpeded consumer privilege prevail to prop up the sense that 
the good-life fantasy is available to everyone. Ideally then, one would achieve both mental 
health and commitment to equality if one embraced precarity as a condition of being and 
belonging. (p. 194) 
Although Lorey does explore the idea of precarity as a form of governance, which 
enhances compliance via a threatening ideal, the point Berlant is making here is that an 
increasingly dominant narrative which entrenches inequality and insecurity does not 
necessarily lead to a rejection of the policies that caused the crisis. In fact, it can have the 
opposite effect, that of individuals adjusting to a new reality while striving ever harder for a 
progressively more distant goal. While Lorey explores the threat aspect of governance, 
Berlant emphasises the lived reality of those experiences. This perspective highlights the 
complexity that exists between complete compliance and total rejection of hegemonic 
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discourses, and the discursive power of norms in creating and legitimising human 
interaction and forms of life. 
Lorey further extrapolates the threat motif inherent in precarisation by exploring 
Castel’s theories.  This is not because she agrees with his analysis (she does not) but as an 
example of an analysis ground in nostalgic Fordist conceptions of security and the 
privileging of anthropogenic norms. She stresses Castel’s zone model of the population, 
which consists of three zones, one of integration, one of disaffiliation and between these 
two an unstable and expanding zone of precarity (Lorey, 2015, p. 46).  Lorey explores this 
analysis to highlight a discourse of precarity as safe within certain limits, but as threatening 
should those limits be overrun.  Lorey contends,  
The threat to existing relations of domination based on security first arises as a result of 
excess, of transgressing the limit of the tolerable number of infections. It is this dynamic of 
the immunisation of a normalisation society upon which Castel’s zone model is based. 
(Lorey, 2009, p. 54). 
 Lorey (2009) later quotes Castel in his analysis of the different levels of precarity to 
emphasise his underlying hierarchisation of precarity “Castel concedes that ‘precarity’ is not 
only a phenomenon of the socially weak or the ‘lower classes’ but that there is also a 
‘higher’ form of precarity. . . those discontinuously employed in the field of theatre, film 
and media “( pp. 54-55 ). For Lorey, Castel’s post-Fordist analysis views precarity as a 
threat to a securitised white middle class via increasing practices of insecure work leading to 
segments of the population becoming progressively disaffected, thereby threatening social 
cohesion as a whole. Castel thereby conflates social cohesion with the security of a specific 
part of the population. He also inherently accepts the hierarchisation of society, where 
precarity itself is not the problem only the extent of who is precarious. Once again 
precarity is not linked to merit, but largely to identity. 
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  Castel’s solutions are built around integrating and assimilating and thereby 
neutralising the danger of the other, while reinforcing anthropogenic norms with the 
exclusion of the ‘foreigner’ who can never be integrated. This results in a domination 
securing dynamic built around a “white majority social middle” (Lorey, 2009, p. 59), which 
continues to be immunised against insecurity, by allowing a larger integration zone, 
redefining who is to be excluded. Although Castel’s answer to the threat of precarity is 
increased integration in order to stabilise the core, Lorey argues that endemic insecurity 
creates the potential for social, political and economic change. While precarity evident in 
marginalised populations can increase governability of the population as a whole, 
precariousness that has become endemic, has the potential to challenge established forms 
of production and governance.  
 
Self-precarisation 
For Lorey, cultural producers who choose precarious work are internally indoctrinated with 
modern definitions of freedom linked to self-regulation, self-discipline and self-
responsibility, ultimately becoming exploitable economic units. Kaufman (2013), 
epitomises this principle when he states “Working at home or in cafes, starting businesses 
with teams of consultants and freelancers you’ve met only online, and even launching 
business ventures that eventually may fail, all indicate “initiative,” “creativity,” and 
“adaptability,” which are very desirable traits in today’s workplace” (para, 9). As such, those 
Lorey refers to as a cultural producer, while others like McGovern (2017) label independent 
consultants, talent, entrepreneurs and Gig Economy workers (p.30), come to characterise 
neoliberal ideologies, subjectified to governmental narratives, connecting insecurity with 
freedom and identifying creativity with insecurity. Ironically, individuals who choose 
precarious work often do so as a form of resistance to hierarchised traditional forms of 
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employment, which often lack creative satisfaction and individual autonomy. McGovern 
(2017) reinforces this point when she states, “others become consultants because they 
wanted to write the great American novel, build furniture, or write music: consulting 
enabled them to fund what might be a less lucrative but more rewarding creative pursuit” 
(p. 30). Implied in this narrative is a choice of lifestyle that is sustainable and fulfilling, and 
while this may be the case for some, this is no way represents the experience of many 
people in precarious work (Lorey, 2016, pp. 89-90). 
As capital has increasingly sought flexibilization in the workforce, combined with a 
rationalisation of social support and workers’ rights, self-precaritised workers have become 
the so called epitome of neoliberal success. Initially Lorey’s focus is only on cultural 
producers as self-precaritised workers (2009), which does limit her exploration. This focus 
also raises questions of an implicit division of self-precaritised workers in her own analysis, 
as she overlooks non creative precarious workers. She does however later redefine cultural 
producers as virtuoso workers (Lorey, 2016). This later definition encompasses all workers 
who are employed in a public space and using their entire self in the creation of surplus 
value, thereby linking virtuoso workers with Arendt’s virtuosity and Hardt and Negri’s 
immaterial labour (Lorey, 2015, p 82-85). This link becomes important in chapter two as I 
discuss self-precarisation and freedom in more depth.  
In her essay “Governmentality and Self-precarisation; On the Normalisation of 
Cultural Producers” (2009), Lorey argues in-depth about what she terms “lines of force” 
(2009, p.188). These lines of force represent historical constructs of assemblages of 
knowledge forms, technologies and institutions, which structure individual ideas of what is 
normal. In constructing what is normal under neoliberal ideologies, individual identities are 
moulded around dominant ideas of self-responsibility, self- regulating and self-
empowerment. It is in this moment, which an individual unthinkingly accepts this version 
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of normal, internalising it,  that his/her choices become limited to the legitimacy imposed 
by that specific construction of normality. At that point, Lorey (2009) argues, the relations 
of power and domination become invisible, and normalising mechanisms become 
naturalised as the subject’s self-evident and autonomous decisions (pp. 192-193). This is 
the ambivalence of biopolitical subjugation and empowerment, the belief in individuals 
making autonomous decisions, while acting within prescribed patterns of behaviour. Self-
precaritised workers represent, for Lorey, the embodiment of subjugation and 
empowerment. This is obvious in McGovern’s (2017) positioning of Gig Economy 
workers as previously stated, as always being in a position to choose their work, ignoring a 
discourse of precarity, in which workers have no choice and limited power to change their 
position.  Lorey argues, that individuals who freely choose to conform to neoliberal norms 
are only acting on a concept of freedom, that is constructed within neoliberalism itself and 
therefore they are not truly free. Lorey states, 
Precisely because techniques of governing oneself arise from the simultaneity of 
subjugation and empowerment, the simultaneity of compulsion and freedom, in this 
paradoxical moment the individual not only becomes a subject, but a certain modern ‘free’ 
subject. Subjectivated in this way, this subject continually participates in (re)producing the 
conditions for governmentality, as it is first in this scenario that agency emerges. (pp. 193-
194)  
Consequently, individuals who choose precarious work, do so within a specific set of 
beliefs, which situate freedom within that choice, thereby reproducing lines of force  
legitimising neoliberal identities and domination, thereby limiting freedom. 
Pivotal in this process is the liberal association of the ownership of property with 
freedom and security. In the past, property ownership provided income, food and a home. 
For wage earners, who would be unlikely to own land, property ownership became 
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synonymous with owning one’s body, for the body to exist as property which can be sold 
as labour power. The body also becomes the site for investment and improvement, as well 
as a means of production (Lorey, 2009).  The separation of an inner essence which reflects 
a unique individuality and a physical body as an inanimate object, rationalises the 
commodification of the body as property. This context emphasises that people can only 
have control over themselves as bodies, they are free in the sense that they choose the 
nature and extent of their own self-development/subjugation. 
 To a large extent an individual’s freedom and security are tied to the unique traits 
inherent in their particular body and the ways in which they maximise that value. In this 
respect the body becomes an asset, to be exploited, by both the individual as an 
entrepreneur and by business. Under Fordist regimes this mechanised view of the body was 
reinforced by the production line, where individuals performed specialised tasks for 
increased productivity. Under post-Fordist neoliberal systems, the body as an asset is 
required to have ever more complex social and emotional traits. This results in an 
expanding view of the mechanisation of the body, with increasing amounts of a person’s 
inner character being commodified and effectively dehumanised. With the creative trait of a 
body being considered a positive productive asset, the anxiety that can be generated by an 
uncertain and insecure life, is made either irrelevant or labelled a weakness. Self 
precarisation is then understood as a rebellion against stable hierarchal employment 
structures which limit the value extracted from the body, and an embracing of self-
regulation, self-responsibilisation and a commitment to an identification with freedom, 
which is still ground in the physical commodification of the body. Freedom in this respect 
is not freedom from economic constraint or necessity, rather this freedom binds the 
individual to an economic uncertainty that continually forces a modifying and reforming of 
personal characteristics to remain competitive (Lorey, 2016, p. 27). Ultimately self-
precarisation has favoured capital’s desire for labour flexibility, shifting the risk of the 
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market onto individuals. The state has embraced this action presenting these workers as 
role-models, promoting entrepeurialism as the pinnacle of freedom.  
Paradoxically, with capital increasingly accessing the social and emotional skills of 
individuals, resulting in new ways for individuals to feel an intensifying pressure to 
conform, modes of empowerment and lines of resistance are also increased. Not only does 
empowerment act to encourage individuals to comply to self-discipline, self-regulation and 
self-governance, but the very nature of empowerment encourages individuals to act 
autonomously. As capital progressively comes to rely on the emotional and social 
intelligence of both the individual and collectivities, as opposed to the Fordist production 
line, it opens up multiple sites of vulnerabilities and potential resistance. Hardt and Negri 
highlight this contradiction when they state, 
This then poses a challenge or even a potential threat to capital because the primary role 
in the social organisation of production tends to be played by the living knowledges 
embodied in and mobilised by labor rather than the dead knowledges deployed by 
management and management science. (2017, p. 115). 
The subjugation/empowerment dynamic which is the basis for the exploitation of self-
precaritised workers, thus is also conversely the site for resistance. 
Although self-precarisation and biopolitical immunisation begin with two very 
different sites of subjectification, they both depend on a specific historical construction of 
normal. While both Lorey and Foucault explore how discursive narratives have influenced 
and moulded both individuals and populations, they create a binary logic in which people 
are either individuals moulded into neoliberal subjects or invisible within a mass 
homogenised entity that includes or excludes ‘others’. However, the very foundation of 
governmentality and biopolitics is the socialability and inter-relationality of individuals, 
reflected in their understanding of power as the producing and reproducing of norms both 
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internally and on those around us. As we become the norms, we further legitimise and 
entrench those beliefs and social expectations on those around us. Butler touches on this 
point when she argues that norms are inscribed on our identity by others, before we have 
the cognitive ability to question them (2015, p. 29). This is the capillary power that 
Foucault recognises, the power of others to prescribe and privilege specific behaviours and 
characteristics. 
 However, individuals also re-inscribe new norms or challenge existing ones at the 
site of subjectification, creating not one singular counter-narrative but a plethora of diverse 
mixtures and adaptations, reflecting a much more fluid and changing process. Berlant 
exposes this diversity by exploring how people experiencing extremely precarious lives 
often respond by a renewed commitment to neoliberalism and the fantasy of a good life, 
rather than the resistance to precarity that Lorey would seem to suppose. As a power that 
produces identities, the very nature of Foucault’s biopolitics is the inter-relationality and 
inter-dependence of individuals on one another.  This alone contests the neoliberal myth of 
the individual competing in a market environment for singular success. And yet this 
dissonance between Foucault’s capillary power and neoliberal norms is often overlooked by 
both Lorey and Foucault.  
Although both Lorey and Foucault offer counter-narratives as a way to explain the 
contestable nature of discursive paradigms, this still seems an overly simplistic explanation 
of the often contractionary way norms are changed. If norms mould and produce 
identities, there seems little space within this dynamic for resistance.  Lorey’s theory of 
precarisation which encompasses both population level grand narratives and individual 
subjectivities, still fails to incorporate all human interaction. As such these ideologies are 
not the only influencers and/or producers of our identity. The very neoliberal ideal of a 
unique individual identity constantly encourages people to refine their distinctiveness 
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within a broad collective, opening up various multiplicities. Although both Lorey and 
Foucault problematise economic, social and political norms, the very translatability of those 
norms is dependent on our existential precariousness as physical bodies and the underlying 
drive to form societies for security. This is what Castel’s fear of social disintegration is 
founded on, an understanding that security is based on a consensus of others. 
 
Conclusion 
Lorey’s theory of precarisation offers an in-depth and complex understanding of the 
discursive nature of social, economic and political paradigms, which ultimately mould our 
actions and define our freedom. Lorey’s self-precarisation argument unpacks the disparity 
between a choice freely made and the power of social and economic discourses to shape 
our identity.  Thereby, invisibly limiting and framing our choices, ultimately undermining 
the very freedom they espouse. Biopolitical immunisation explores the segmenting and 
exclusion of parts of the population in order to secure an idealised core. Both these 
theories rest on the historical construction of a norm and the power inherent in both the 
enforcement and acceptance of that norm. Within the context of precarity, the privileging 
of white males forming a secure core population continues to underscore the gendered, 
immigrant and marginalised make-up of precarious workers (Betti, 2018; Vosko, 2000). 
Lorey’s theories are ground in Foucault’s original analysis of the individualisation of 
citizens and the seemingly opposing idea of the totalising of the population. However, 
between these two spaces there exists a notion of individuals within communities, both 
acting as individuals and as communal agents that both Lorey and Foucault fail to explore. 
Also, the complexity of influences on identity and the formation of identity itself is often 
flattened in their examinations. 
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The aim of this chapter has been to build on and extend Foucault and Lorey’s 
biopolitical examination of the complexity and communality in reproducing social control. 
While there are compelling analyses of the influences and forms used to govern 
populations using precarity, there does exist areas concerning individual autonomy and 
freedom that do require a more in-depth examination.  Freedom for Lorey is inherently 
bound up in neoliberal lines of force which produce our domination. However, a different 
definition of freedom which emphases our inter-connectivity and challenges neoliberal 
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Chapter two 
Precarity and Freedom 
 
But if, said Marx,  the true realm of freedom begins when and where necessity is left 
behind, then a political economic system based in the active cultivation of scarcity, 
impoverishment, labour surpluses and unfulfilled needs cannot possibly allow us entry into 
the true realm of freedom where individual human flourishing for all and sundry becomes a 
real possibility.  (Harvey, 2014, p. 208) 
 
Precarity and freedom would at first glance seem to be situated at opposite sides of any 
sociological/political analysis of society. Precarity, precariousness, the precariat and 
precarisation would all seem to exemplify a highly unstable life, in which less freedom to 
live as one chooses could reasonably be expected to be the norm. While freedom seems to 
have contained within it an expectation of a life free from the worry of the necessities of 
survival, a life where one could freely choose what to do and how to be, freedom is often 
used to describe both a secure life and equally to justify a more precarious one (Brown, 
2016; Harvey, 2005; Lorey, 2015; Miller & Rose, 2008). Embedded within freedom are 
discourses which reflect dominant hegemonic societal norms. This often leads to changing 
associations of freedom, and the frequently contradictory nature in which they are 
contextualised. From Berlin’s positive and negative liberty, to Arendt’s republican freedom, 
the neoliberal freedom of the individual and the markets, the democracy of free choice, 
even the collective freedom of workers’ rights, freedom has long been a contested ideal. 
Although there is a rich and varied debate on freedom, my focus in this chapter is more 
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narrowly concentrated on the role discourses of freedom can have on contesting and 
legitimising precarity. With that in mind, I specifically explore the paradox of neoliberal 
freedom within a precarious context. This exploration is ground in Foucault and Lorey’s 
problematisation of hegemonic discourses of freedom, which often highlight the coercive 
nature of neoliberal ideals.  Further I investigate Butler and Lorey exploring a Republican 
ideal of freedom, epitomised by Hannah Arendt, that may offer a foundation for an 
alternative understanding of freedom, which questions the legitimacy of precarity.  
The discursive nature of freedom, as constructed within society, is something 
Foucault spoke extensively about in his lectures at the College De France, highlighting the 
historical changes underlying liberal governance (Foucault, 2007, 2008). Nikolas Rose 
(1999) suggests a multifaceted understanding of freedom. He argues that freedom can be 
understood as either a formula of resistance or as a formula of power. In exploring 
freedom as a formula of power, Rose reinforces Foucault’s interpretation of freedom as 
framed by social interaction and as it is instantiated in government: 
freedom as it has been articulated into norms and principles for organising our experience 
of our world and of ourselves; freedom as it is realised in certain ways in exercising power 
over others, freedom as it has been articulated into certain rationales for practising in 
relation to ourselves. A genealogy of freedom in this sense would examine the various ways 
in which the relations between power and freedom have been established. (p. 65). 
 Although this articulation of freedom emphasises the aspects of control that are often 
inherent in a neoliberal freedom, this is seldom the notion of freedom that neoliberalists 
themselves would express. Milton Friedman (2002) argues that individual and political 
freedom, which further extends to societal freedom, is synonymous with economic 
freedom. He also argues that economic freedom provides the environment for other forms 
of freedom to flourish. He states that “freedom in economic arrangements is itself a 
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component of freedom broadly understood, so economic freedom is an end in itself. In the 
second place, economic freedom is also an indispensable means toward the achievement of 
political freedom” (p. 8). Friedman contends that economic freedom promotes political 
freedom because it separates “economic power from political power and in this way 
enables one to offset the other” (p. 9) So while Freidman’s analysis of freedom also 
explores structures of power, he specifically targets political power as limiting freedom, 
ignoring economic structures which disperse both economic power and therefore freedom 
unequally. His definition of freedom would seem to be very narrow, confined to restricting 
the power of the state by expanding economic forces as an antagonistic check and 
encouraging individual enterprise in the freed economic space. However, the neoliberal 
freedom of the markets is built on the necessary interaction of others, therefore this 
freedom is a societal freedom ground in our inter-relativity. While Friedman creates a 
vision of a monolithic state acting in uniform, intent on imposing order, in contrast with a 
vibrant individualistic economy, he undermines the inter-relationships and interconnectivity 
between the economy, the people and the state.  
Because freedom is defined within a social context there are always compromises, 
rather than an absolute freedom which could only be expected outside society, reflecting a 
form of freedom free from the interference and constraints of others9. However, this 
freedom would increase our existential precariousness, ultimately tying us to continually 
recreating the necessities of life, in the fear that any illness or injury could result in our 
death. Society then offers us a level of protection against precariousness, a recognition that 
 
9 Isaiah Berlin’s 1958 essay titled “Two Concepts of Liberty” famously argued that there were two 
strands of freedom. A negative strand comprised of freedom from interference and coercion, and a 
positive strand comprised of freedom to develop and grow both intellectually, emotionally and socially. 
Berlin maintains that negative freedom is a truer form of liberty as it allows for more individual choice, 
whereas an excess of positive freedom can lead to totalitarianism in the form of the nanny state. 
Neoliberals endorse negative freedom. However, the idea that negative freedom offers individuals more 
choice seems to be inherently based on everyone having access to resources to be able to freely make 
choices beyond merely living a survivable life. 
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we are better off and safer together, and yet our freedom must be compromised in order to 
account for the freedom of others. Although our precariousness is mitigated, we recognise 
threats still exist from others both within and without society, highlighting the ambivalent 
nature of security and precariousness, which ultimately derives from our dependence on 
others. Consequently, both our freedom and precariousness are defined and contingent on 
other people. This is in contrast to a neoliberal positioning of individual endeavour within 
the economic realm as the personification of freedom. 
If we start from this point, that our freedom and precariousness are defined and 
contingent on other people, then an understanding of how different discourses of freedom 
are being used to both justify and challenge precarity seems pertinent. How does freedom, 
as it is exercised in certain ways, exert power over others and how does precarity disperse 
and reproduce that power both individually and collectively? The basis of Lorey’s 
precarisation theory is a Foucauldian understanding of freedom, that is ground in a 
neoliberal composition of norms that are coerced and prescribed on both individuals and 
society. At the centre of Foucault’s theories is a potential freedom that exists at the site of 
individual subjectification, a possibility of a refusal to comply, an opportunity to create new 
narratives and social norms. Hannah Arendt’s essay on freedom, as explored further below, 
offers a different narrative of freedom. However, Arendt’s essay offers as many problems 
to modern theorists as it does solutions. Nevertheless, Isabell Lorey and Judith Butler both 
engage in aspects of Arendt’s essay, in order to reconstruct a freedom that undermines the 
legitimacy of precarity. With this in mind, I explore over this chapter how Isabel Lorey and 
Judith Butler use aspects of Hannah Arendt’s 1961 essay “What is Freedom” to reconstruct 
a new narrative of freedom. This narrative is based on our inter-relationality, challenging a 
neoliberal norm of free-will as an enaction of freedom. It reconstructs a modern 
conception of performativity which transcends the public/private divide and contests an 
idea of freedom built on economic necessity, arguing that economic needs constrain 
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freedom. Although both theorists have similarities in their approach, Butler offers a 
necessary depth to Lorey’s interrogation of freedom and precarity, further extending it 
beyond an economic analysis. I argue that their differences reinforce and contribute to a 
more complex understanding of freedom as inter-relational and contingent on others and 
that this challenges the legitimacy of precarity.   
 
Foucault and freedom 
At the centre of Foucault’s biopolitics and governmentality thesis, is the recognition of two 
different strands of freedom on which liberal governance was constructed. The first strand 
of freedom is represented by the fusion of freedom and the market. Foucault spends a 
great deal of time analysing the historical shift of the market to a site for freedom and 
truth, a place that represents minimal interference from the state. The combination of the 
word ‘free’ with ‘market’ then became synonymous with freedom, and freedom came to be 
associated with minimal regulation from the state. That is not to say that freedom outside 
the market did not exist, but rather that freedom within the market became more valued 
and more easily conflated with a wider understanding of freedom. Nor did this mean that 
the economic arena represented a more complete concept of freedom, only that by 
emphasising freedom as free from state regulation were other constraints to freedom, such 
as economic security, obfuscated.  As such a free market came to be associated with a 
wider concept of freedom, despite its narrow focus. Therefore, economic success reflects 
individual freedom and individual freedom is built on economic success.  It is this form of 
freedom that ultimately makes individuals more easily governable. Foucault states that: 
it lets them say that one is right to give them the freedom to act . . . adherence to this 
liberal system produces permanent consensus as a surplus product, and symmetrically to 
the genealogy of the state from the economic institution, the production of well-being by 
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economic growth will produce a circuit going from the economic institution to the 
population’s overall adherence to its regime and system. (Foucault, 2008, p. 85) 
Foucault’s biopolitical freedom then forms, the basis of social, political and economic 
patterns of behaviour that are co-constitutive. These behaviours are designed to limit and 
mould individual behaviours towards self-discipline and self-regulating conducts, which are 
intended to grow the economy. This market driven strand of freedom recreates power 
dynamics which have entrenched inequality, ultimately reducing freedom and choice for 
some. This first strand of freedom becomes the site for potential refusal and rejection of 
the entire system or part thereof. Ironically this freedom is at the very site of subjectivity of 
the individual, an aspect that both Lorey and Butler explore further.  
The second strand of freedom, biopolitics, represented for Foucault, the 
recognition of the state’s focus on the management of a population of individuals as a 
specific art of government that characterises liberal states. The responsibility of the state 
was to manage the overall health and well-being of individuals in a way that convinced 
individuals it was for their own good. Inherent in a biopolitical liberal government are the 
processes and narratives which enable a state to govern autonomous, free living beings 
within a security society. However, a key aspect of Foucault’s biopolitics, is the 
understanding that individuals are convinced, cajoled, influenced and coerced to act in ways 
that the state or other dominant institutions consider appropriate and productive, but they 
are not forced or dominated. Biopolitics is built on the supposedly free collaboration 
between individuals and the state: 
When one defines the exercise of power as a mode of action upon the action of others, 
when one characterises these actions by the government of [sic] men by other men [sic]– in 
the broadest sense of the term – one includes an important element: freedom. Power is 
exercised only over free subjects and only insofar as they are free. (Foucault, 1982, p. 790) 
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Foucault’s concept of an autonomous individual being coerced by governmental 
rationalities and social norms, while still maintaining a potentiality to resist or refuse 
entrenched power structures, does however, encounter some problems. Foucault’s 
autonomous individual would seem to be able to problematise normalised neoliberal 
narratives, regardless of how dominant and/or internalised they may be. Admittedly this is 
an area in which Foucault appears to limit his analysis, but the question of how free an 
individual is when social, political and economic institutions and narratives hegemonically 
create specific social norms remains a valid one. He does sidestep the issue by arguing that 
freedom remains a potentiality at the site of subjectification, rather than a limited reality or 
otherwise. Foucault instead offers counter narratives as an empirical example of resistance 
representing freedom, by arguing that hegemonic narratives will always produce 
opposition, which in turn may become hegemonic itself. 
 
Lorey and freedom 
Lorey builds on Foucault’s thesis of biopolitics and governmentality, arguing that post-
Fordist governmentalities have created a new paradigm of precarity/freedom, redefining 
traditional constructs in their demand for flexible labour. Lorey problematises freedom in 
multiple ways. Although her theory of precarisation would at first glance seem to be 
focused on highlighting new structures of power and domination, what she exposes is how 
those structures increasingly limit freedom for some, specifically through precarity.  Her 
exposure of current definitions of freedom emphasise the often contradictory nature of 
freedom, when applied to empirical circumstances. She states that, “when domestic security 
discourses are correlated with normalised social insecurity in neoliberalism, then the 
fundamental dispositive of liberalism shifts. Instead of freedom and security, freedom and 
insecurity now form the new couple in neoliberal governmentality” (p. 64). This relates to 
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her cross examination in questioning how free individuals actually are, when they choose 
precarious work. In this she highlights an environment where people are led to believe that 
insecure work is the ultimate manifestation of freedom and is inherent in the construction 
of creative identities. Lorey characterises these workers as virtuoso workers stating that, “as 
all experiences of individuals tend to become part of the production process, self-
realisation takes place as a performance in public. Work thus virtually becomes a virtuoso 
performance” (p. 73). This is the point at which Lorey engages with Arendt’s definition of 
freedom, and it is a complex one in which she both challenges and concurs with aspects of 
Arendt’s freedom in an effort to form a new, more comprehensive understanding of 
freedom that retains autonomy even in precarity. 
 
Arendt and freedom 
Hannah Arendt in her essay “What is Freedom’ (1961), defined freedom as action in the 
political realm amongst one’s peers. This form of freedom was premised on the individual’s 
liberation from the necessities of life. Arendt argues for a republican understanding of 
freedom based on individuals performing and debating within a polis. She claimed that 
freedom cannot exist in an internal dialogue, or in thought itself, as thought is driven either 
by motivation or free will.  As such Arendt argues “thought itself, in its theoretical as well 
as its pre-theoretical form, makes freedom disappear” (p. 145).  Freedom is not found in 
the private sphere either, as this is where the necessities of life are dealt with. Anything that 
can influence, motivate or drive a person’s actions towards the self can only be an 
impediment to freedom. Action therefore cannot be driven by free will or self-sovereignty, 
as these two concepts create competition and encourage self-serving behaviours, imposing 
one person’s advancement over another’s. In this context, Arendt identifies free-will as 
oppositional to freedom, as it places the individual above the polis or political community. 
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In this Arendt’s freedom privileges a collective understanding of freedom over an 
individual one. Freedom meant stepping outside the home into a public space, peopled by 
your peers and entering a body politic to speak your mind in front of an audience, acting 
for the overall good. Arendt states that:  
Obviously not every form of human intercourse and not every kind of community is 
characterised by freedom. Where men [sic] live together but do not form a body politic as 
for example . . . in the privacy of the household – the factors ruling their conduct are not 
freedom but the necessities of life and the concern for its preservation. (p. 148) 
Arendt relates freedom to politics as a fact of everyday life in the political realm, arguing 
that it is impossible to conceive of politics without accepting an idea of freedom.  The two 
are inextricably intertwined. These two ideas form the basis of her essay: that of the 
political realm and that of principled action. Clearly Arendt is drawing parallels between a 
more modern world and the Greek polis, where free men came together to discuss and 
argue politics in a principled manner. In this way she feminises the private realm and the 
necessities of life as not free, while the public spaces of men coming together collectively 
arguing in a rational and principled manner, are a physical representation and enaction of 
freedom. Arendt’s freedom then, is not for everyone equally, only for those who are 
wealthy enough to be free from the necessities of life. This is an important point in 
acknowledging how choices framed by economic necessity are not actions of freedom.  
 
Lorey, Arendt and Butler 
Lorey develops Arendt’s definition of freedom by placing it within a precarious context. 
She argues that the modern era has collapsed the divide between a public/private realm, a 
divide that privileged a masculine public arena in which freedom was enacted, while the 
private sphere was feminised and understood as non-political. This public/private divide is 
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a core concept in Arendt’s understanding of freedom, as she rebuilds an updated vision of 
the Greek polis, as a public place of political debate and performance. Lorey revisualises 
the Greek polis in the age of the internet, recognising that performance now happens in 
both public and private spaces, and that often the performer and the audience are no 
longer necessarily in the same place, experiencing the act at the same moment. Not only 
has the private become public via the internet, but ironically the public has also become 
more private, through the enclosure of the commons and widespread privatisation. 
For Lorey however, the public/private debate is merely setting the scene for her 
major interrogation of Arendt’s interpretation. Lorey associates virtuoso workers with 
political actors because of their public performance, however she argues that virtuoso 
workers are not free, despite Arendt’s assertion that public performance involving risk is 
free. Arendt concedes that her definition of freedom would include actors giving public 
performances, which she then classifies as political acts.  She does however argue that the 
process of creativity is not carried out publicly and so remains private therefore neither 
political nor free. Only the end result of the creative process, which is shown publicly, can 
be considered a representation of freedom. While this seems a minor issue for Arendt, it is 
this point that Lorey’s main engagement with Arendt’s thesis takes place. 
Once Lorey establishes a connection between what she terms virtuoso workers and 
Arendt’s public performers, she further undermines Arendt’s assertion that this constitutes 
freedom by contesting Marx’s concept of productive labour. Traditional Marxists argue 
that someone who exchanges a service for money is not considered productive, unless they 
are employed by someone else, in which case they are producing a surplus and therefore 
producing capital. Here Lorey argues that a self-entrepreneur, by capitalising herself, 
incorporates herself completely in creating a service which she is paid for. Immaterial 
labour today such as communications, knowledge, service providers and virtuosos have 
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marketed themselves as capitalised forms of life, branding their individualism as a 
marketable product, producing surplus-value and thereby expanding on Marxist definitions 
of productive labour. This reconceptualisation of labour away from traditional Marxist 
thought involving a worker producing a product which a capitalist profits from, towards an 
understanding of an individual’s intellect being the product, which a capitalist profits from, 
highlights the subjectification of virtuoso workers even when performing under the gaze of 
others. The relationship between a person’s private thoughts, and actions are commodified 
in the interests of an increasingly competitive labour market. Lorey states that, 
“subjectifications and social relations emerge in this production process” (Lorey 2015, p. 84). 
For Lorey, this forming of an individual in response to neoliberal economic ideals 
undermines freedom, creating new forms of life and subjectivities.  
Lorey argues that the creative process and the act are not separate as Arendt 
describes, but rather involve the entire person in both processes. In effect the virtuoso 
worker capitalises her/himself as she/he is both the process and the product. Her/his 
motivation for doing this is driven by economic reward. Therefore, according to Arendt’s 
own argument, her/his action in the public sphere, although they have risk attached, 
cannot be free (p. 78-79). Further Arendt argues that political action in a public realm must 
be based on principles. Motivation, Arendt argues, is dependent on something and 
therefore not free. Action under the guidance of the intellect is also not free, with both 
motivation and intellect revealing will-power. It is only principled action that she considers 
to be free. Therefore, Lorey reasons, Arendt’s differentiations between various forms of 
freedom supports the assertion that this public economised acting is not political action. 
Lorey states “Thanks to the ‘shift from action to will-power’ according to Arendt, the ideal 
of freedom ceased to be that of the virtuosity of acting together with others ‘and became 
sovereignty, the idea of a free will, independent from others and eventually prevailing 
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against them.’” (p. 86). Therefore, any action in a public space that is driven by economic 
will or intellect, is neither truly political nor truly free.  
Both Lorey and Arendt explore how individual sovereignty has led to a lack of 
freedom and although their analyses are different, they lead to a collective understanding of 
freedom which challenges individual neoliberal narratives. For Arendt the movement of 
sovereignty away from a single Hobbesian monarch, towards individual citizens has created 
a dynamic that ultimately undermines collective association, something that remains 
fundamental to her concept of freedom. This transfer of sovereignty has resulted, Arendt 
argues, in free will being embedded in competitiveness and built on an imposition of 
others. She states that,  
philosophers first began to show an interest in the problem of freedom when freedom was 
no longer experienced in acting and in associating with others but in willing and in the 
intercourse with oneself, when, briefly, freedom had become free will. . .  the ideal of a free 
will, independent from others and eventually prevailing against them.” (p. 163).  
For Arendt, free will is self-centred and driven by egotism, ’I-will’ as opposed to’ I -think’. 
Free will leads to greed and short termism instead of the “utopian tyrannies of reason” 
(p.163) endorsed by ‘I-think’. As such, free will oppresses and opposes those around it, in 
turn being oppressed or opposed by those same others. She argues that the idea of self-
sovereignty leading to freedom is an illusion, that in fact freedom and sovereignty are 
incompatible, both for groups and individuals ‘where men [sic] wish to be sovereign, as 
individuals or as organised groups, they must submit to the oppression of the will. . . If 
men [sic] wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they must renounce.” (pp. 164-165).  
While Arendt understands self-sovereignty as a will to power, leading to the 
oppression of others, Lorey defines sovereignty as an inward form of oppression.  For 
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Lorey, sovereignty in a neoliberal society is expressed as a form of governance over oneself. 
Lorey states that: 
Although such individualised virtuoso action takes place according to the old logic of a 
presumably sovereign self-formation independent of others, at the same time it is also an 
action of self-subjugation that is accompanied by fear. Hobbes’ fearsome sovereign, whom 
the subjects were supposed to obey, has long since been transformed – and to an extreme 
degree in neoliberalism – into a self-governing fear. (p. 86) 
In this respect, individual sovereignty has meant a focus on self-control and self-
responsibility. Individual’s success or failure within a competitive, marketised neoliberal 
society is within their own purview. This belief distracts from structural and institutional 
inequalities and differentials of power, instead creating a normalisation of individual 
commodification based on anxiety and fear of vulnerability, ultimately leading to and 
justifying self-precarisation practices. Although both view self-sovereignty as undermining 
freedom, despite ideas conflating sovereignty with freedom, they both understand 
individual sovereignty differently. Arguably Lorey’s contemporary understanding offers a 
sounder analysis, reflecting an explosion of self-help and self-responsibilising literature, 
which atomises individuals as economic units, required to provide for themselves within a 
context of power and contingency which limits their ability to do so (Brown, 2015, p. 134). 
However, despite Arendt’s simplistic analysis of a free-will doomed to oppress or be 
oppressed, she does highlight the potentially exploitative nature of a competitive free-will, 
constantly acting for its own fulfilment at the cost of others. Thus, an acknowledgment of 
power differentials within a narrative of self-sovereignty would likely expose a degenerating 
freedom, experienced by those more vulnerable to precarious life and work conditions. For 
both Arendt and Lorey, recognition of a dependence on others is the grounding principle 
for any concept of freedom. 
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Both Butler and Arendt acknowledge an idea of freedom that is based on others. 
Arendt reasons that “We first became aware of freedom or its opposite in our intercourse 
with others, not in an intercourse with ourselves” (p. 148). She later posits that “Freedom 
needed in addition to mere liberation, the company of other men [sic] who were in the 
same state” (p.148), reinforcing an idea of freedom among equals. This recognition that 
freedom is a collective exercise rather than the atomised self-regulation endorsed by 
neoliberal governmentalities is the basis for Judith Butler’s views on individual bodies 
acting together in a shared recognition of vulnerability (Masquelier, 2018, p. 14). Butler 
argues that “freedom is more often than not exercised with others. . . (as) a set of enabling 
and dynamic relations that include support, dispute, breakage, joy and solidarity.” (2016, p. 
27). However, Butler’s collective freedom is constructed on a common acceptance of 
precariousness as a physical vulnerability of life that connects us all. As such her freedom is 
far more inclusive than Arendt’s, providing a basis for an understanding of resistance as a 
coalition between autonomous bodies and a questioning of the unequal dispersion of 
precarity, that is reflected in the differentially exposed populations experiencing economic, 
social and political vulnerability.  
In this context Butler uses precariousness and precarity to represent different 
experiences. For Butler, acting collectively does not undermine the differentness of the 
bodies involved. Freedom is then created in an acknowledged inter-dependence on one 
another, not only by individuals acting in political spaces as Arendt suggests, but by 
everyone who experiences precariousness, even though those experiences differ.  Precarity 
offers a context for interrogating why some bodies are more precarious than others and 
proposes an ethical platform to question the validity of those claims. Butler does not 
impose a uniformity of experience within precarity or vulnerability nor does she endorse a 
hierarchy of vulnerability. 
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This position naturally leads to the question of what role economic necessity has in 
undermining freedom. For Arendt it is not possible for a person to be free, to act free if 
they are driven to make decisions based on self-preservation or economic necessity (p. 
148). In the same way, Arendt links the space for economic necessity to the private sphere, 
defining both actions which provide for life and the space traditionally recognised as 
feminine as unfree and non-political. This conflation of the two is something that Butler 
specifically deconstructs, arguing that a recognition of our common precariousness forces 
us to ask the question of how ought I live? Or an even more political question of how 
ought we to live together? These questions place economic necessity and the private sphere 
central to political action, recognising the person as an agentic creature, whose actions in 
the public sphere are dependent on living processes and others commonly associated with 
the private sphere. Obviously Arendt’s feminisation of the private sphere has garnered 
much critical engagement from feminists over the years (Benhabib, 1995; Zerilli, 1995),  
but  I would like to emphasise the point, that Arendt’s freedom is based on the assumption 
that individuals who are acting in a public forum and thereby exhibiting freedom, have 
access to care and economic security, that is sufficient  not simply to survive but to 
flourish. And that this economic security and care is dependent on and provided by others, 
to whom this form of freedom would be unobtainable. This leads us back to Butler’s 
ethical platform of a shared precariousness, undermining our social political and economic 
structures. After all, why are some lives livable while others are only survivable? 
Arendt’s thesis is built around division. She perceives distinct boundaries between 
private and public spaces, but also between social and economic spheres and between 
private thoughts and public action. Her concept of an individual who is able to separate 
economic desire from rational thought and principled action as separate from intellect, 
appears idealistic and at times arbitrary, but this understanding is implicit and necessary to 
construct her essay on freedom. Arendt considers the mind to be completely free, as no-
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one else has the power to enter the place where man subdues his desires and struggles 
against his baser nature, the mind is a place more securely shielded from outside influence 
than a home could ever be (Arendt, 1961, p. 148). This idea of the human intellect as a 
fortress buttressed from outside influence, achieving a state of principled knowledge in 
which what is right is knowable and universal, is an idea that is platonic in its origin, but 
really fails to address the complex social and economic interactions in a contemporary 
neoliberal era. Foucault, Lorey and Butler radically contest this idea, emphasising the 
influential nature of the social which permits economic and political ideas to become 
internalised in a social narrative, that normalises behaviours and even individual reality. In a 
neoliberal era, economic ideas have become a form of principled rationality, in which moral 
obligations are weighed and justified in a cost benefit analysis; where people are reformed 
as homo economicus, agents acting in a marketplace that pervades political and social 
spheres; where politics itself, Arendt’s bastion of freedom, is contextualised as national 
financial success in which the health of the population is conflated with GDP growth. 
Butler’s exploration of speech acts as a performative act, both as an imposition and 
a contesting of precarity, expands Arendt’s performative freedom, while conversely 
opposing her assumption of the mind as unassailable. Butler (2018) argues that 
performativity characterises linguistic utterances at the moment of being spoken, to make 
something happen, or bring something into being. Butler states “performativity is a way of 
naming a power language has to bring out about a new situation or to set into motion a set 
of effects.” (2018, p. 28). Butler seeks to link the power of language with public protest in 
recognising that discourses often provide a legitimacy to protest and a commonality among 
protesters. But at an even deeper level, she argues that language also creates individual 
performance, for example, a baby’s gender being named then influences the way individuals 
interact with that baby, further influencing how that baby learns to act its gender, both 
publicly and privately. The discursive power of speech acts enacted upon us before we have 
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cognitive reason to challenge them, then have the power to produce us, form our identity 
and frame our reality.  However, in a very Foucauldian dynamic, these identity norms 
become self-reproducing, in that we re-produce our own subjectivity. Nevertheless, it is in 
the reproduction of norms, that Butler argues things can go awry “in the very midst of our 
enactment, another desire starts to govern, and forms of resistance develop, something 
new occurs, not precisely what was planned.” (2016, p. 31).  In this way Butler links the 
performative action of speech with both the enactment and the opposing of power 
relations. Further to individual acts of opposition, Butler expands this discursive 
performance to coalitional protests, relating it to Arendt’s ideas of politics and freedom 
being performances in a public arena.  
Butler then deepens her analysis further by arguing that strength is not quite the 
opposite of vulnerability, in fact vulnerability can mobilise collective protest, making 
precarity itself the public performance. Butler concedes that:  
This is probably not what Hannah Arendt had in mind when she said that politics depends 
on acting in concert – I can’t imagine she would have much liked the Slut Walks. But 
perhaps if we rethink her view that the body, and its requirements, becomes part of the 
action and aim of the political, we can start to approach a notion of plurality that is thought 
together with both performativity and interdependency. (Butler, 2015, p. 151).  
The body and its requirements refer to Arendt’s necessities of life. Although Arendt uses 
this argument to separate those individuals who are driven by economic needs and 
therefore unable to act freely, Butler turns this argument around, arguing that what bodies 
need for a livable life must surely be a precondition for the broader political aims of life. In 
this way Butler relates freedom to a public performance of vulnerability and a wider 
empirical question relating to the conditions of a livable life. Perhaps not quite in the way 
that Arendt would have supposed her essay to be interpreted and yet her assertion that you 
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are not free unless you are not concerned with the necessities of life, does become more 
relevant in a period where those necessities may not be equally accessible. 
 
Conclusion 
Hannah Arendt’s essay of freedom, at the time it was published in 1961, offered an 
alternative theory of freedom, that contested a liberal ideal of liberty that was becoming 
increasingly hegemonic. In a modern context, aspects of Arendt’s theory remain 
problematic. However, her ideas of freedom being contingent on others, on the 
performative nature of freedom and the idea of economic necessity and self-sovereignty 
being constraints for freedom, have offered Lorey and Butler a fertile basis to deconstruct 
and recreate a contemporary counter narrative for freedom. Lorey’s argument focusses on 
the collapsing of public and private divisions associated with virtuoso workers, 
problematising an often gendered understanding of what is work and what is not.  Butler’s 
argument constructs an understanding of the discursive power of norms as performative 
acts and the power of collective performance as protest. In this way while both Lorey and 
Butler agree with aspects of Arendt’s essay their differing interrogations and interpretations 
of that freedom, complements and expands their individual theories.  
Combined, this presents a deeper understanding of the paradoxical role freedom 
plays in contesting and legitimising precarity. As a starting point a theory of the inter-
relational nature of freedom within society, which draws on both an understanding of 
autonomous individuals acting collectively and the nature of our actions having impacts on 
others, has to discredit an acceptance of precarity in which certain populations are 
differentially exposed to economic, social and political vulnerability. The very action of 
forming a society is based on the imperative to collectively protect ourselves from our 
physical vulnerability, our precariousness. Our freedom should therefore begin with an 
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understanding of how we might equally share and protect ourselves against that 
precariousness.  
While a different discourse of freedom may provide a legitimate platform to contest 
precarity, the nature of a form of resistance that is inherently diverse and disparate, building 
collectivities to protest precarity is also very much a debated issue. Protest as a 
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Chapter three 
Precarity and Resistance 
 
At the same time, no matter what the protest is about, it is also, implicitly, a demand to be able to 
gather, to assemble, and to do so freely without the fear of police violence or political censorship. 
So though the body in its struggle with precarity and persistence is at the heart of so many 
demonstrations, it is also the body that is on the line, exhibiting its value and its freedom in the 
demonstration itself, enacting, by the embodied form of the gathering, a claim to the political. 
(Butler, 2016, pp. 17-18) 
 
Freedom and resistance are often understood as inherently linked together, to resist 
something can be realised as an assertion of freedom, an act that revolves around a refusal 
to comply or accept an act, a statement, a categorisation, or any other form of domination 
perceived or otherwise. Although public protest or individual forms of resistance to 
hegemonic ideals are often automatically conflated with acts of freedom, those acts may or 
may not lead to freedom enhancing outcomes. Put differently, when discussing mass 
demonstrations of resistance, there is always an element of freedom in the individual act of 
assembly, however, the overall intent of the demonstration may be seeking more or less 
freedoms on society as a whole. For example,  Destiny Church, a conservative 
fundamentalist church, which protested against same sex marriage in 2004 was seeking to 
challenge a lifting of restrictions on who could marry.  They were protesting against 
increased freedoms for the queer community, arguing that these freedoms undermined the 
Church’s ideology and security of the wider community. For this reason, it is important to 
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understand freedom as something that is more complex than just resistance. However, in 
this chapter I will focus predominately on resistance as an act of freedom, both individually 
and collectively. 
  During the Fordist economic era, the dominance of capital was contested primarily 
by the solidarity of workers, largely organised under a union mantle, protesting for worker’s 
rights. Although this did not represent all resistance to capital during this era, nor was this 
form of resistance equally available to all workers, this was however an era in which this 
form of resistance rose to prominence. The overall decline in mass organised industrial 
strikes (Vandale, 2016) through the 1980s and 1990s, highlights the changing economic, 
structural and social paradigms, which challenged previous norms around work and 
protest. This is reinforced by Hardt and Negri’s claim “that traditional unions cannot 
represent adequately the complex multiplicity of class subjects and experiences” (as cited in 
Jorgensen, 2015, p. 966). Recent forms of resistance such as Occupy and EuroMayDay 
often represent multiplicities of resistance, breaking away from formal institutions and a 
logic of contradiction (Han, 2018), which have principally framed industrial relations 
protest. Both Occupy and EuroMayDay can be understood as multi-layered, representing a 
wider systemic dissatisfaction with the unequal dispersion of resources necessary to live, 
often highlighting precarity in its many formulations and experiences (Jorgensen, 2015; 
Han, 2018; Neilson & Rossiter, 2008; Trott, 2013). Frequently these forms of resistance 
blur the boundaries between labour protests and social movements and highlight the often 
disparate nature of precarious protest, which often crosses socio-economic divides and can 
advance complex demands.   
  In order to question forms of resistance ground in precarity it is important to 
comprehend the disparity and diversity that are common characteristics of precarity. 
Neilson and Rossiter (2005) elaborate on this when they state that precarity is underscored 
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with multiplicity and division, both as a socio-economic category, an ontological grouping 
and also as an object of academic study (p. 55).  It would seem then, that although precarity 
itself is often characterised as contradictory and diverse (Ettlinger, 2007; Han, 2018; 
Jorgensen, 2015; Lorey, 2015; Munck, 2013; Neilson & Rossiter, 2005, 2008; Vij, 2019), so 
too are the academic critical frameworks used to define who is and who is not precarious. 
How theorists define the precarious has major repercussions for how they specify and 
construct precarious resistance. 
  Standing’s precariat reflects a very structured specific categorisation of precarity, 
built around class solidarity, with resistance linked to a charter of specific demands 
(Standing, 2009, 2014a, 2014b, 2016,). Lorey’s definition of precarity is more 
encompassing, grounded primarily in insecure work, while also recognising a wider process 
of precarisation as a hegemonic form of governance. Her resistance is based on refusals to 
conform to neoliberal identities prescribed by both capital and the state and viewed as 
forms of dominance (Lorey, 2009, 2010, 2015). She proposes care strikes as a challenge to 
neoliberal individualism and as a reconfirmation of our interdependency. In this, she 
argues, that precarious resistance is not just about struggles over living conditions and ways 
of thinking, but also over forms of governing (2015, p. 111). Butler defines precariousness 
as an ontological condition of human existence that is common to everyone. Although she 
defines precarity as a politically induced unequal allocation of economic and social 
resources across certain populations (2016, p. 33), ultimately revealing normalised beliefs in 
whose life should be more livable. As Butler’s definition of precariousness is the most 
widely inclusive, so her understanding of precarious resistance is more extensive. Butler 
argues not for a resistance to precarity, but that precarity provides a mobilising dynamism 
that challenges preconditions, which form the unequal distribution of the conditions of life 
itself and the exercise of freedom (Butler, 2015, p. 133). 
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 Within these theories the interaction of precarity, freedom and resistance differ, 
with freedom being defined as security (Standing, 2016), as both security and insecurity 
(Lorey, 2015, p. 64) and as resistance encompassing both vulnerability and autonomy 
(Butler, 2015, p. 141).  Standing’s concept of the precariat as a “dangerous new class,” 
however, reflects traditional paternalistic hierarchies of vulnerability, has western based 
ideas of work identity and security, and relies on a threat motif of necessarily incorporating 
the other to maintain security of the whole. In this way, Standing encapsulates aspects of 
Lorey’s biopolitical immunisation as discussed in chapter one. As such, Standing fails to 
comprehend new forms of resistance arguing that “asserting individuality and identity 
within a collective experience of precariousness as more theatre than threat” (2016, p. 2-3). 
This more traditional way of conceptualising precarity reflects an understanding of 
resistance built around a class identity and reflects an androcentric social and economic 
structure, which linked freedom to the security of a white male breadwinner, that typified 
Fordist relations between capital and labour.  
However, a broader more encompassing theory of precarious resistance as 
encapsulated by both Lorey and Butler, highlights two key questions; is it possible to have a 
form of resistance that maintains singular identities and different demands within a large 
collective group? and is the definition of precarity so broad that it loses analytical meaning 
as a form of resistance? In order to explore these questions within the confines of this 
chapter, I have chosen to focus on three key thinkers in the field of precarity and 
resistance; Guy Standing, Isabel Lorey, and Judith Butler. All three have different 
perspectives on precarity and resistance, thus by exploring all three I aim to highlight the 
problems inherent in a narrow categorisation of both precarity and resistance. I argue that a 
wider conceptualisation allows theorists to expose and explore the moving multiplicities of 
precarity that exist in resistance today. In particular, Lorey and Butler’s theories allow for a 
dual narrative of precarity, as both a socio-economic framework that normalises insecure 
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work and an ontological condition of existence. This dual narrative allows for specific 
responses to insecure work, while offering a wider understanding of differential 
experiences and identities, as it problematises the structures of power which frame and 
normalise insecure work. In this both Lorey and Butler ensure the autonomy of precarious 
individuals, reflecting an underlying belief in an equality of freedom, that may or may not 
reveal normative associations of equality.  Butler’s ontological precariousness provides a 
common ground for diverse experiences of vulnerability, which while extensive, maintains 
analytical meaning by the distinction Butler offers between vulnerability, precariousness 
and precarity.  
 
Standing’s theory of resistance 
Guy Standing’s precariat is a neologism, combining the words precarious and the 
proletariat. Standing argues that the precariat represents “a distinctive socio-economic 
group, so that by definition a person is in it or not in it” (2016, p. 8). He believes this 
distinctive socio-economic group, which is defined by its relation to insecure work and lack 
of occupational identity as outlined in the seven forms of labour insecurity he lists, ( I 
cover these further in the next paragraph) is a new class in the making, which sits beneath 
the traditional working class. In fact, the precariat is not the only new socio-economic 
group which Standing identifies, although they are the group which has attracted the most 
attention. The other groups he identifies as having distinctive sets of entitlements and 
patterns of security are the global elite, the salariat, the proficians, the core working class, 
the precariat, the unemployed and the detached (2009, pp. 102-115). Each class represents 
varying levels of both income security and occupational identity, with Standing delineating 
the precariat as commonly lacking in all forms of labour security, including social forms of 
support and state support.  
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Standing’s seven forms of labour security are instrumental in differentiating his 
construction of new classes. Although each class has differing relationships with these 
forms of labour security, Standing asserts that the precariat is the only class to lack all seven 
(2016, p.11). These forms of labour security are the foundations upon which industrial 
citizenship was built by trade unions, labour parties and social democrats for the working 
class, after the Second World War. They are: labour market security, epitomised by a 
government commitment to full employment; employment security, involving protection 
against arbitrary dismissal; job security, ability and opportunity to retain a niche and access 
to upward mobility; work security, protection against accidents and illness at work; skill 
reproduction security, opportunities to gain skills through apprenticeships, employment 
training and so forth; income security, assurance of an adequate stable income; 
representation security, possessing a collective voice in the labour market (2016, p. 12). 
Although job security and employment security would seem to be similar, Standing argues 
that while someone may be a permanent employee, constant changes to their position 
within the company both regionally and globally can create insecurity.  
While Standing does not specifically list social income under labour security, he 
does highlight a lack of social income as another defining feature of the precariat. The 
composition of social income he further breaks down into six elements; self-production, 
money wage, family or local community support, enterprise benefits, state benefits and 
private benefits from savings and investments (2016, p. 13). Standing contends that the 
precariat suffers from a lack of community support, of assured enterprise or state benefits 
and private benefits as well as insecurity around money wages (2016, p. 14) 
Although Standing often refers to the precariat as the “new dangerous class” 
(Standing, 2009, 2014a, 2014b, 2016), he deftly sidesteps the issues around class definitions 
by referring to the precariat as a “class in the making”. He states that the precariat has 
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“class characteristics” such as “people who have minimal trust relationships with capital or 
the state, making it quite unlike the salariat. And it has none of the social contract 
relationships of the proletariat” (2016, pp. 9-10), while also asserting that the precariat is 
not yet a class for itself in the Marxian sense of the term (2016, p. 8). What the precariat 
lacks, according to Standing10, is a class consciousness or a common identity in which to 
build a unified sense of solidarity. Rather, it is a class at war with itself (2016, p. 28).  As 
such Standing further demarcates three factions within the precariat. 
 The first faction he names the atavists, which consists of old working class families 
who maintain a sense of loss for a Fordist era type security, to which they feel entitled to. 
Standing describes this faction as yearning for the past, blaming migrants and minorities for 
increasing job insecurity and a loss of social support. He characterises this group as tending 
to vote for nationalistic political parties, endorsing xenophobic and racist agendas. The 
second faction are migrants and ethnic minorities who feel a sense of loss, for a place to 
belong. Generally, Standing notes, they keep their heads down, concentrating on survival, 
except when they feel politically threatened, exploding into days of rage (as in Stockholm, 
2013), or join fundamentalist groups in an attempt to recover a sense of identity. The final 
faction, progressives, is made up of educated mostly young people (although some older 
people are included), and also some members of the salariat. They feel a loss of a dignified 
future. Unlike the atavists they do not listen to neo-fascists, but rather look to build a new 
future, a “good society” one that is based on “progressive values of equality, freedom and 
an ecological sustainability” (2014b, p. 11). As such, the precariat is far from homogenous. 
Standing perceives this conflictual nature as an inability of the precariat to clearly speak for 
itself. He states, “The lack of programmatic response was revealed by the search for 
 
10 Other theorists such as Erin Wright (2015) and Ronaldo Munck (2013) argue that the precariat is not a 
class in its own right but rather a particularly vulnerable part of the working class. 
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symbols, the dialectical character of the internal debates, and the tensions within the 
precariat that are still there and will not go away” (2016, p. 3). 
Standing views resistance for the precariat as based around three overlapping 
struggles; the struggle for recognition, for representation and for redistribution (Standing, 
2014a, pp. 138-144). Currently he argues, the precariat does not yet have any of these, 
although he recognises that events in 201111 have drastically improved the sense of identity 
coalescing around the precariat. Standing often regards previous precarious resistance as 
examples of primitive rebels, and/or of theatre over substance, understanding precarious 
resistance as an evolving movement that will prove successful as it resolves the three 
struggles for recognition, representation and redistribution. This will crystallise the precariat 
into a class capable of political and social protest, that will transform society (Standing, 
2009, 2014a, 2014b, 2016). By conceptualising the precariat as a class, albeit a class in the 
making and/or a class at war with itself, Standing frames resistance for the precariat as 
those forces of domination that impose insecure work and a loss of occupational identity. 
In response to this Standing in A Precariat Charter, from denizens to citizens (2014) proposes a 
manifesto of 29 articles, designed to act as political demands to redistribute security both at 
a financial and occupational level, through regulation by the state. 
Standing’s interpretation of the gendered aspect of precarious work is interesting 
and often ambiguous. Although he recognises that a higher percentage of women are 
precariously employed (2016, p. 71), he implies that this work situation is inherently 
characteristic for most women and therefore not necessarily as problematic as it is for men. 
 
11 Standing perceives this year to be the pinnacle in the EuroMayDay protests, arguing that this represents the 
primitive rebel phase of protest possibly followed by a period of darkness until a new phrase of protest 
commences built around solidarity and class. Standing views this year as particularly successful for the 
precariat because of the election success of The Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy, a populist political party 
advocating a universal basic income. (Standing, 2014, p. 137).  
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Rather an increase in women working12 in precarious work has had the unfortunate effect 
of increasing competition for men, a general degradation of permanent employment and 
stagnating wages. Standing states “Early in the globalisation era, it became apparent that 
women were taking a growing proportion of all jobs. . . This was feminisation in a double 
sense of more women being in jobs and more jobs being of the flexible type typically taken 
by women” (2016, p. 70). Standing later argues that the family wage which was part of the 
industrial age and the compact between capital and the working class, has also been lost 
with the “individualised wage’ favouring employment of women, whereas the lower wage 
induced a lower “effort bargain” from men. Women it seems, at least according to 
Standing, never expected to be paid a family wage (2016, p. 70). These assertions of 
precarious work and lower wages that somehow seem  more acceptable and less 
problematic for women, sit alongside Standing’s statements of the importance of reducing 
gender based wage differentials and discrimination. Although he openly acknowledges that 
women are over-represented in precarious employment, he remains focused on the 
detrimental impacts precarious work has on men, in particular in their role as breadwinner 
and provider (2016, p. 74). 
There are many critiques of Standing’s conception of the precariat, focussing 
predominantly on his classification of the precariat as a class (Munck, 2013; Neilson & 
Rossiter, 2005; Wright, 2015). This critique is based principally on an assertion that the 
precariat is part of the working class. Wright (2015) expresses a common critique arguing 
that the material interests of both the precariat and the working class against capital 
exploitation coincide, therefore they cannot be separate classes. While Munck (2013), and 
 
12 Standing refers to this increase in women working in recognised employment rather than unpaid 
reproductive work as the “feminisation of labour” (2016, p.70). This term “feminisation of labour” seems 
problematic to me for two reasons. The first is the implication that labour was gender neutral previously, 
which then positions this new era as a female invasion of labour.  The second implication is that labour itself 
now has feminine characteristics, thereby placing men at an unfair disadvantage.  Rather than seeking ways to 
address the issues of precarity and exploitation, this term the “feminisation of labour” would seem to 
entrench gender differences. 
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Nielson & Rossiter (2005) further contend that the diversity inherent in the precariat 
exhibits the characteristics of a socio-economic condition not a class. Another common 
critique of  the precariat is the Western centric assertion of the current era normalising 
precarious work as an exception, (Betti, 2018; Han, 2018; Jorgensen, 2015; Masquelier, 
2018; Munck, 2013; Neilson and Rossiter, 2008), with many theorists highlighting the 
common occurrence of precarious work in the global South before, during and after 
Western Fordism. Included in this critique is an acknowledgment that even within an era of 
secure work there existed those who were excluded, i.e. many women, minorities and 
migrants, thereby making precarious work the norm for most of the world, not the 
exception as Standing asserts.  
However, the critique I will focus on, is highlighting how Standing situates the 
precariat within a liberal understanding of the individual, which conflates security with 
autonomy and privileges an understanding of precarious resistance as evolving along pre-
determined hierarchical lines. Within a liberal post-colonial context, Standing uses a 
narrative of biopolitical immunisation to neutralise the ‘other’ (the migrant section of the 
precariat), while evoking the threat of social dissolution through the danger of an angry 
androcentric core via the atavists. Instead he predicts that hope lies with the progressive’s 
left wing politics of paradise, with migrants keeping their heads down ultimately following 
the lead of either faction (Standing, 2014b). Effectively Standing marginalises and silences 
migrants within their own resistance, while effectively marginalising a feminist perspective. 
Ritu Vij (2019) in his article “The Global Subject of Precarity” argues that Standing 
uses precarity as a “liberal analytic, tethered to and framed by liberal accounts of the 
sovereign subject” (p. 508). This liberal analytic presupposes the vulnerable subject as 
supplicant or dependant, lacking in dignity, while those experiencing security are portrayed 
as autonomous, rational and productive. Although Standing does state that “vulnerable 
- 85 - 
 
groups also need agency” (2016, p. 183), his analysis of the precariat often conflates 
insecurity with irrationality and fear, as when he states “unless the anxiety is moderated, 
anchored in security, stability and control, it risks veering into irrational fears and incapacity 
to function rationally or to develop a coherent narrative for living and working” (2016, p. 
181). He also states, “The precariat is stirring precisely because it suffers from a systemic 
insecurity” and later, “a sense of stability is required in order to be rational, tolerant, and 
compassionate” (2016, p. 202). This is the “liberal subject of security, forged and sustained 
within a specific (unequal) ordering of the modern international” (2019, p. 508) that Vij 
addresses. The idea that insecurity brings irrational fear, undermines any rational dialogue 
from those experiencing insecurity. In this analysis those in insecure situations are already 
incapable of rational objective resistance. In this Standing defines freedom for a large part 
of the precariat, arguing that they are incapable of demanding what he considers a 
constructive freedom for themselves. In their vulnerability, Standing assumes, they have no 
autonomy. 
Standing reinforces this irrationality, when he frames precarious resistance as “days 
of rage” (2014b, p. 11) and “activities of primitive rebels” (2016, p. 195). He further 
undermines the precariat’s freedom to speak for itself, by describing part of the precariat as 
“the bad precariat. . . fuelled by nostalgia . . .It is angry and bitter” (2016, p. 183). Although 
the “bad precariat” is offset by the “good precariat”, the good precariat are represented by 
those who are educated, as opposed to the working class, who have fallen into the 
precariat, therefore the good precariat still exhibits an ability to be rational. Vij states that: 
in a capitalist social context where qualitative hierarchies of wealth and want measure self 
and social worth, subjectivity and well-being are put into jeopardy. The precarious here join 
the ranks of the ‘underserving poor’ their material lack evidence of the lack of personal and 
social self-worth. (2019, p. 511).  
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Although Vij is describing a very neoliberal internalisation of social norms, something that 
Standing is problematising, Standing’s continued conflation of irrational behaviour with 
insecurity, undermines the very autonomy he is arguing for, situating the precariat as 
needing rational secure support and leadership. In Standing’s liberal analytic, those living 
and working outside the security zones, are mostly unable to articulate and organise a 
rational resistance to precarity precisely because they are precarious. This reveals Standing’s 
liberal bias, linking the working uneducated poor with an inability to provide sufficiently 
for themselves, thereby needing protection from and in spite of themselves. Extrapolating 
on this narrative is a rationale that undermines the ability for the precarious to speak for 
themselves. Their very vulnerability then justifies a response in which others are deemed 
more appropriate to decide their freedom for them, further undermining their autonomy. 
Standing’s assertion that the precariat is a dangerous class, exemplifies what Isabel 
Lorey identifies as a contemporary dialogue of immunisation (2015, pp. 41-61). She states  
Modern discourses of immunisation no longer solely involve potential dangers from the 
outside. There has been an awareness of immanent danger; the endangered weak position 
is part of society, and if its endangerment is not controlled and regulated, it can only be 
contained at best. Should the danger spread, however – and this kind of proclaimed 
potential danger underscores the urgency of this model of argument – then the entire 
society is endangered and threatened with disintegration and breakdown. (2015, p. 44) 
She further elaborates that security societies comprehend this internal weakness as an 
excess that is no longer governable, can no longer be controlled and therefore challenges 
the normal order. Standing’s portrayal of the bad precariat, the atavists, and the 
emasculation of men in an increasingly feminised competitive work force are examples of 
the potentially dangerous part that threatens rational society. They are fuelled by the loss of 
their secure position in society and by an image of an invader, disrupting social norms, 
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taking what should rightfully be theirs and jeopardising security. The threat implied is that 
unless the precariat is appeased, social disintegration, authoritarianism or revolution will 
surely occur. In this way they are not only unable to speak for themselves, but they 
represent an internal danger that must be neutralised. 
Although Standing argues for the rights of migrants to be recognised, identifying 
them as a large part of the precariat, the language he uses often supports preconceived 
notions of migrants as emotional, sullen and dangerous. Standing portrays migrants as both 
the other that need incorporating, (Standing, 2009, 2014a, 2014b, 2016) the target of the 
atavistic section of the precariat (or the bad precariat) (2014b, 2016) and the accepting non-
speaking subservient part of the precariat (2009, 2014b, 2016). He depicts their resistance 
as irrational and extreme, potentially threatening social stability (2014a, 2016), 
contextualising migrants as either emotional and dangerous or compliant and sullen, the 
eternal other. In Work after Globalisation Standing situates migrants as “The Precariat’s 
Dilemma” (2009, p. 239) arguing that if curbs to migration are retained, then cheap illegal 
labour will threaten living standards and socioeconomic security. However, if migrants are 
legalised and granted access to state benefits, particularly if those benefits are means tested, 
then poor migrants may reach the front of the queue before local claimants, leading to a 
demonization of migrants by traditional ‘white’ working class. The answer Standing offers, 
is not a problematisation of old racial stereotypes, but an alliance between the good 
precariat and the proficians class, whose income is also insecure. The implication is that 
proficians are more able to provide a policy framework for effective resistance, as their 
work identity and income elevates them higher up the hierarchical class ladder. The 
traditional ‘white’ working class are ruled by prejudice and fear, while migrants are 
problematic, whether they are illegally invading and securing jobs or legally taking state 
benefits they are supposedly not entitled too. 
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Ironically migrants can also be understood in Standing’s argument as a passive 
power that sits behind the progressive part of the precariat. As such Standing conceives of 
migrants as an amorphous group lacking in agency, being acted upon, but rarely acting for 
themselves. In contrast Jorgensen (2015) and Neilson & Rossiter (2008), view migrants as 
the basis of the precariat and the greatest potential for revolution. Where Standing 
articulates danger, Jorgensen (2015) formulates a different form of resistance, moving away 
from resistance based on solidarity towards new forms of multiplicities, that cross previous 
divisions, encompassing diverse and changing situations. Where Standing conveys division 
as weakness, turning the precariat against itself, Neilson & Rossiter (2008) view those same 
divisions as inherent characteristics of precarity, arguing that the nature of precarity is 
movement and unpredictability, offering a form of resistance that is changing and 
multifaceted. Both these theorists perceive migrants as fundamental to the nature of 
precarious resistance. This is in stark contrast to Standings conception of precarious 
migrants as either hoping to be saved by progressive precariat resistance or waiting to be 
demonised by the atavistic precariat. 
 
 
Lorey’s theory of resistance 
Lorey’s definition of the precariat is broader than Standings and primarily focussed on the 
process of precarisation as a governmental tool to help manage the population (Lorey, 
2009, 2010, 2015. 2011). As such insecure work forms the foundation of Lorey’s analysis, 
but her focus also encompasses who is precarious, in addition to how and why they have 
become precarious. For this reason, Lorey specifically does not hierarchise precarity by 
creating differing levels of vulnerability. Instead she recognises that in the demarcations 
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and divisions such as those commonly ascribed to Standings class divisions13, pockets of 
the population are labelled as needing more protection, often resulting in more governance 
and less autonomy and freedom (2015, p. 108). Furthermore, in stark contrast to Standing, 
Lorey claims that precarisation cannot be tamed by a unifying politics of representation 
(2015, p. 109), as it fails to allow for very different modes of precarious existence. Because 
levels of insecurity can be subjective and objective, Lorey is arguing for a form of resistance 
that does not impose itself uniformly across all precarious experience. Rather her emphasis 
is on relations of domination that coalesce around self-government, undermining the social 
and political influences exerted on individuals to comply with neoliberal ideologies, which 
normalise precarity, thereby challenging freedom. She states that: 
In the neoliberal dynamic of governmental precarisation, the illusion of individual security 
is maintained specifically through the anxiety over being exposed to existential 
vulnerability. In the permanent race for the hoped-for securing of one’s own life and that 
of one’s immediate social milieu against competing others, the fact that a lastingly better 
life cannot be an individual matter is obscured. (2015, p. 90) 
Within the context of Lorey’s theory of precarisation therefore, her exploration of 
precarious resistance focuses not so much on “how to prevent and end the threat of 
precarity that is driving the disintegration of order”  but rather “where, within these 
governing mechanisms, cracks and potentials for resistance are to be found” (2015, p. 2). 
Consequently, Lorey’s resistance is subtle and complex, built on a merging of Foucault, 
Deleuze & Guattari and Virno, in addition to incorporating her own interpretation of a 
resistance that is immanent and decentralised to structures of power and domination. While 
Lorey’s ideas of resistance are multifaceted and comprehensive, including any and all 
 
13 Standing has two distinct classes that are characterised by insecure work. The precariat and the proficians. 
Standing situates proficians separately from the precariat as they are generally higher paid and insecure by 
choice, as such Standing categorises their insecurity as less vulnerable than those in the precariat (2009, pp. 
102-115).  
- 90 - 
 
subversions of neoliberal self-governance, at times her argument seems too deeply 
philosophical and abstract. Her construal of Virno’s exodus as a refusal to comply with 
exploitable power relations, rather than a massive defection from the state, can appear to 
fail to disrupt the status quo, dependant as it is on remaining immanent to those power 
relations. However, her logic does interrupt the biopolitical immunising discourse of a 
threatening precariat that justifies freedom for some at the continued expense and 
exploitation of others. As such, Lorey’s resistance theory comprehends the precariat not as 
a class in the making, nor a potential class for itself, but rather as a diffuse, changing 
ultimately precarious potentiality. This allows her to explore sites of resistance that are not 
easily universalised or categorised, rather reflecting multiple sites of resistance both 
empirically and in the theoretical repositioning of self-government, to incorporate new 
modes of living in disobedience (2015 p. 102). It does also provide a foundation for 
highlighting emerging forms of resistance which challenge normative neoliberal self-
governing, creating new forms of autonomous freedom. 
Central to Lorey’s theory of immanent exodus is her exploration of Paulo Virno’s 
theory of exodus as outlined in his essay “Virtuosity and Revolution: The political theory of 
exodus” (1996), which she uses to deepen Foucault’s analysis of power relations. Foucault 
briefly explored the example of the struggle between the Roman patricians and the 
plebeians which resulted in the contestation and reformation of power relations, and it is 
this example which Lorey (2008) in her essay “Attempt to think the Plebeian; Exodus and 
Constituting as Critique” further elaborates on with the concept of immanent exodus. In 
this historical account of the plebeian’s non-violent temporary exodus to the outskirts of 
Rome to protest patrician power, Lorey perceives an alternative to resistance that is 
antithetical in nature. The result of the plebs refusal and exodus from the city, highlights 
the boundary of power exerted over the plebs by the patricians, both in a political sense 
and a very literal one. By camping outside the city boundaries, the plebs formed their own 
- 91 - 
 
political body, re-negotiating their position within the city, emphasising the inter-dependant 
nature of both the plebs and the patricians and the necessary compliance of their own 
subjectification. This resulted in the patricians conceding a seat in the senate to the 
plebeians, thereby restructuring power dynamics between the two groups. However, this 
reorganisation of power was limited, it did not question, revoke or reverse the dominant 
status quo, only forcefully created space for a limited sharing of power. While Foucault 
finds in this example an understanding of the plebs position as that which exists at the 
boundaries of the previously acceptable framework of power, a re-forming of new political 
narratives in which power shifts, Lorey views this also as an opening up of new 
potentialities.  
However, it is Virno’s exodus, that Lorey uses to deepen Foucault’s concept of the 
plebeian resistance. Hetzel (2016) argues that Lorey’s articulation of the plebs exodus more 
accurately reflects Occupy and the Arab Spring movements and a more original form of 
democracy. The concept of exodus has been historically linked to the exodus of the 
Israelites from Egypt and their consequent refusal of Egyptian sovereignty. While their 
physical journey represents their resistance to exploitation and the consequent formation of 
a new political body, their exodus was both a physical act and a permanent one (Hetzel, 
2016). Virno takes the idea of the Israelite exodus from Egypt and applies that concept to 
frame resistance to power relations inherent in post Fordist labour conditions and the 
servility they invoke. In a Marxist analysis of labour, Virno articulates capitalism’s 
exploitation of the worker, in the alienation of the worker from his/her own means of 
production (Hetzel, 2016, p. 195) In this, Virno’s exodus does not need to be a physical 
removal from sovereignty as exhibited by the plebeians and the Israelites, but a mass flight 
from labour under the employer (Hetzel, 2016, p. 195). Virno understood this as an exit 
option rather than a voice option epitomised in active protest against exploitative situations 
(Virno, 2005, p. 20). This option as a form of protest meant modifying the conditions 
- 92 - 
 
within which the conflict was being played, not a negative gesture which exempts one from 
action and responsibility. In this context Virno understood the preference for many young 
people to work precariously during the 1960s and 1970s, as a desertion, or a strategy of 
flight away from previously accepted work relations. Hetzel argues that Virno realised these 
work relations as “the attribution of subject positions, to the creation of fear, and, 
eventually, to submission” (Hetzel, 2016, p. 195).  
Ironically, Lorey applies Virno’s exodus as a form of resistance to those same 
precarious work conditions that Virno stressed as a line of flight away from previously 
established employment constructs. This highlights the mutability of capitalist exploitation 
and the paradoxical nature of precarisation which can exist as a form of governing and 
control but also as a potentiality for resistance and contestation. In this way precarity itself 
is productive. It is productive in the Foucauldian sense of producing “instrument(s) of 
governance and a condition of economic exploitation, and also as a productive, always 
incalculable and potentially empowering subjectification” (2010, p. 8). This is the 
empowerment subjectification site for compliance and/or resistance, that is the basis for 
Foucault’s potential site for a new resisting counter narrative and which Virno and Guattari 
& Deleuze offer as a framework in which these counter narratives proliferate in many 
different ways, in many different circumstances. Such as the so-called queering of 
narratives which are necessarily re-produced in an ongoing reconstruction of self-identity 
that Butler (2018) articulates. This is the essential space where autonomous rationalisation 
and problematising of ideas can transform into resistance that is an independent reflection 
of freedom. That governmentalities can produce compliance and resistance is important to 
acknowledge, however a hegemonic narrative reinforced with structural social, economic 
and political support would seem to need more than a potential site for resistance to 
challenge the status quo. 
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While Lorey builds on Foucault’s idea of a boundary or outside of power relations 
in which new constitutions can be created, she incorporates Virno’s exodus as an 
immanent refusal within those boundaries in order to recreate new conditions of living and 
working. Lorey states  
An exodus from neoliberal governmentality arises from the rejection of captialisable self-
government and the turn to a self-conduct that tests new modes of living in disobedience. 
These kinds of rejections are not a deliverance from all previous neoliberal entanglements, 
but rather the beginning of engagements and struggles to no longer be governed and no 
longer govern oneself in this way, at this price. (Lorey, 2015, p.102). 
Lorey uses Delueze and Guattari’s ‘line of flight’ to further build on her theory of 
resistance, extending both Foucauldian counter narratives and Virno’s immanent exodus. 
She does this by describing a movement away from a “dominant model of being limited 
and threatened by others, and from preventative care focussed on what is one’s own” 
(Lorey, 2015, p .99). Interestingly Lorey links Deleuze’s and Guattari’s line of flight with 
Foucault’s reversal or flight from power relations, however the assumption that both 
theories represent the same thing is contested.14 Deleuze and Guattari’s line of flight is 
based on rhizomatic assemblages of people, thoughts, actions, animate and inanimate 
objects linking together like parts of a machine, constantly adding to and breaking away to 
form new assemblages some lasting a small amount of time, others lasting an inordinate 
amount of time. In this way they describe a society that is constantly changing and moving, 
there is not one line of flight deterritorialising an assemblage, but countless lines of flight. 
In combining Foucault with Virno and Deleuze & Guattari, Lorey is creating a theory of 
precarious resistance that eludes “the binarity between command/law on the one hand and 
 
14 Edward Thornton in his PhD thesis on Deleuze and Guattari’s Line of Flight, makes the point that 
Deleuze and Guattari disagreed with Foucault arguing that “’assemblages seem fundamentally to be not 
assemblages of power but of desire (desire is always assembled)’ and that within these assemblages there are 
‘lines of flight which are primary and not phenomena of resistance or counterattack in an assemblage, but 
cutting edges of creation.”’ (quoted in Thornton, 2018, p.192) 
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revolt on the other, in order to return again with a shared capacity and fight (Lorey, 2008, 
para 19). This form of resistance also reflects the inherently changeable nature of precarity 
itself, allowing for protest to take various forms of refusal or reconstituting of power 
dynamics within existing social economic and political frameworks, both as a singular actor 
and/or a multiplicity of actors.  
  Central to Lorey’s analysis of resistance is a reconception away from the neoliberal 
individual towards an understanding of inter-relationality that is based on shared 
differentness (2015, p. 100). In this Lorey is arguing against Butler’s commonly shared 
precariousness as a platform for equality, as she argues that precariousness cannot be 
commonly defined. Lorey’s idea of a shared differentness is somewhat confusing however, 
as the basis for her political and social resistance to precarity. While Lorey acknowledges 
the importance of establishing what is commonly shared in order to change existing 
relations, she argues that there is no possibility of referring to a commonly shared 
precariousness. What is common, Lorey asserts, is not something that has already always 
existed, but rather it is produced in political action which exists within social and political 
relations. What is common becomes visible only in fleeing and the process of constituting 
(Lorey, 2015, pp 100-101). This is a very broad understanding of precarious resistance, 
which could easily incorporate both the far-right and far-left political ideologies. Both 
Lorey and Virno emphasise the ambivalence of power relations and precarity, which would 
only seem to underscore the point that a resistance based on the commonality of fleeing 
and constituting could just as easily lead to even more exploitative living and working 
conditions. An example of this is the initial exodus from secure employment, which was 
seen as restrictive and hierarchised, towards precarious employment representing more 
flexibility and freedom. Ultimately this exodus has resulted in vulnerable workers being 
more exploited with less protections in place. Thus, it would seem to make sense that in 
order to avoid this situation, precarious resistance would need a common understanding of 
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what it is fleeing from, in order to ensure a more positive outcome. Lorey further ties the 
action of fleeing to Arendt’s concept of freedom being linked to a new beginning. 
However, Lorey seems to assume that these actions will automatically result in new forms 
of living that are not subject to neoliberal ideologies, however as in the case of the political 
stand-off between the plebeians and the patricians, power may simply adapt, offering 
slightly more freedom to some, while continuing to exploit others. 
Lorey specifically explores the militant research carried out by Precarias a la deriva 
and the care strikes as empirical examples of her theoretical framework. Precarias a la 
deriva is a feminist initiative that situates itself between activism and research. Although 
they have been active in Madrid from 2002, they no longer operate under Precarias a la 
deriva (literally translated this means precarious women adrift (Tirler, 2018)). In particular, 
Lorey advocates their resistance thesis based on a logic of care, as a way to resist individual 
practices promoting self-care and the reconstitution of the body solely as a site for profit. 
The Precarias warn against “traditions of thinking that refuse our fundamental social 
relationality, warn against infection by others, maintain a logic of individualism and 
security, and thus perceive precarisation solely as a threat” (Lorey, 2015, p. 94). In contrast 
they propose a focus of care resulting in a two-fold purpose. First a focus on care 
highlights the interdependability of all human beings, emphasising the relationality and 
vulnerability of bodies and the care necessary from others for bodies to survive, from the 
beginning of life to old age. This rhetoric encompasses the variability of care relationships 
necessary throughout life. Secondly a focus on care situates care work, which has 
traditionally represented either a precarious gendered area of employment, or the unpaid 
reproductive work usually performed by women, as a starting point for political and 
economic reform. By raising the status of care work, through greater work protection and 
higher renumeration and acknowledgement, caring for others becomes a quality that is 
more venerated in society. Care then becomes a basis for commonality that represents an 
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acknowledgment of our interdependability and vulnerability, across both precarious and 
securitised segments of the population. Conversely this also targets specific post-Fordist 
work practices, which demand permanent availability while cutting labour and social rights. 
In this context Precarias argue for care strikes as a form of resistance. Lorey states that: 
The practices of care and the refusals taking place within them, with their major and minor 
resistances, should be articulated ‘to produce new more liberatory and cooperative forms 
of affect’. Social relationships are ‘striked’, according to the Precarias by producing 
excesses that flee from the interests of profit . . . The strike practices encompass 
interruptions and ruptures as well as inventions and improvisations. In them, new forms of 
living together and new forms of constituting emerge, with a view to changing 
fundamentally the ‘increasingly precarised world.’ (Lorey, 2015, pp. 97-98) 
Lorey understands care strikes not only as challenges to preconceived norms of 
neoliberal work and identity, but also as a reconfiguring of the power dynamics under 
which capitalism takes place. They also epitomise the singular and collective responses to 
resistance and protest that Lorey articulates, as care strikes can take place anywhere, at any 
time, for any length of time. In this way their singular action is contextualised within a 
larger multiplicity, with individual disruptions building towards a larger narrative of 
common resistance, while also incorporating larger more organised protest. 
Although Lorey’s theory of precarious resistance is built around an underlying 
respect for autonomous action as a representation of freedom, for even the most 
vulnerable parts of a precarious population, at times her rhetoric seems to flatten 
vulnerability at a level where these refusals are still an option. In this, her predisposition to 
focus on cultural producers as precarious, influences her contextualisation of individual 
refusals challenging neoliberal power relations. When individual care workers are deemed 
as disposable labour, singular acts of protest would pose more threat to the workers that to 
capital. This would be true across those parts of the population to whom precarious work 
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is constructed on a day by day basis. In these situations, protest can result in lost income 
and reduced hours. Rather a collective response would offer more challenge to dominant 
capitalist relations. However, the question remains in Lorey’s precarious resistance whether 
there would be enough commonality across precaritised populations to form effective 
collective responses. As Gerald Raunig (2007) notes of the precariat, “How can a form of 
organization emerge that fosters the exchange, the intercourse of differences more than 
unifying them? 
 
Butler’s theory of resistance 
Judith Butler’s definition of precarity is complex, wide-ranging and multi-layered involving 
a separation and interlocking of precariousness, precarity and vulnerability. As such her 
theory of precarious resistance endeavours to fundamentally redefine what it is to be 
human. Although some theorists argue that Butler’s philosophy is too encompassing, and 
inherently dependent on a normative idea of equality, consequently undermining her 
liberatory politics (Tsantsoulas, 2018; Vij, 2019), others argue that her ontological theory of 
a politics of vulnerability and her exploration of the interrelation of ethics, politics and the 
social sphere is exceptional (Gilson, 2013).   Her characterisation of precariousness is 
commonly accepted and often referenced by other major writers on precarity (Ettlinger, 
2007; Han, 2018; Masquelier, 2018; Millar, 2017; Trott, 2013; Neilson & Rossiter 2005) 
including Lorey (2015, pp. 11-12).  
Butler defines precariousness as an ontological experience of life as an embodied 
being. As such she views precariousness as “a feature of all life, and there is no thinking of 
life that is not precarious” (2010, p. 25). This definition therefore covers all human and 
non-human bodies, with Butler recognising precariousness as a shared existential 
experience of life that is fundamentally common to us all. Precarity, however, she defines 
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as “that politically induced condition in which certain populations suffer from failing social 
and economic networks of support and become differentially exposed to injury, violence 
and death” (2009, p. 25). This definition and differentiation between precariousness and 
precarity is a defining feature of Butler’s theory of resistance. While Standing and Lorey try 
to define a commonality among the precariat/ precarised, Butler is arguing that this 
commonality already exists. It is the reason why we come together and also the reason why 
we unequally distribute resources to secure our own vulnerability (2015, pp. 43-45). This 
then demarcates some lives as more livable. Social, political and economic norms then 
legitimise and justify this unequal dispersion of precariousness, making structural inequality 
and bias invisible. This reinforces Butler’s assertion of a precarious ontology that is 
inherently social, political and economic, framing our understanding of who is recognisable 
and who remains invisible. 
Gilson (2013) further elaborates on a definition of vulnerability, that she believes is 
inherent in Butler’s theory but not made explicit. Vulnerability she argues, refers to a more 
pervasive sense of instability and insecurity, one that is not specifically linked to the 
conditions of life as precariousness is (p. 46). Gilson further elaborates that vulnerability 
can be linked to emotional vulnerability and ecological vulnerability, in a way that 
precariousness which is connected to life does not. Thus, vulnerability underlies affective 
conditions of existence. Although these three definitions are at times indistinct and often 
overlap, they do remain important as a foundation for Butler’s theory of resistance, which 
encompasses both physical and affective vulnerability, while building on an 
acknowledgement of shared precariousness as a new basis for recognising our inherent 
interdependability and shared responsibilities. 
Butler exposes the overlapping dynamic of precarity, precariousness and 
vulnerability.  In particular, she navigates the vulnerability/invulnerability paradigm in a 
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way that breaks with the conventional dynamic of vulnerability equating with a loss of 
autonomy. She argues that there is a intrinsic danger in labelling populations as vulnerable. 
Specifically, Butler analyses how this term, when applied to women, has resulted in 
entrenching societal forms of power, by legitimising a patriarchal protection of women, 
wherein women are cast as forever vulnerable thereby justifying their precarity.  The danger 
Butler recognises is when precarity is understood not as a temporal or structural situation, 
but as particular to specific groups. Although her focus is on women, this can also apply to 
migrants and other marginalised groups. From a feminist perspective however, the 
historical belief of women’s bodies as passive and men’s bodies as active (Butler, 2015, p. 
139), easily justified regimes of power which degrade autonomy for women at the cost of 
protection. The result becomes a sociological observation, which reinforces traditional 
patriarchal responses. Women become associated with vulnerability because social and 
economic structures are underlining their precarity, the response is framed as men or a 
patriarchal structure providing protection, which then reinforces and normalises women’s 
vulnerability. Although Butler uses gender to reinforce this argument, these same 
observations apply to the eternal threat motif of the ‘other’ or the protection of minority 
groups for their advancement. In this narrative, protection is given while undermining 
autonomy and thus freedom.  
For this reason, Butler states, it is important not to equate vulnerability with a lack 
of autonomy, rather to be able to think of vulnerability and agency together (Butler, 2015, 
p. 139). This view contradicts Standings contention of a precariat that is unable, or not to 
be trusted, to speak for itself. In terms of precarious resistance, to understand vulnerability 
and agency as co-existing opens up binary paradigms in which vulnerability is conflated 
with a lack of security and freedom and an inability to provide for oneself. It also 
challenges a pre-conception of freedom existing in security as Standing maintains. Butler 
argues that vulnerability is not only a mobilising force for resistance against precarity, but 
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also a site for autonomy and political action (2016, p. 13). As such, she argues for the 
legitimacy of those experiencing precarity to speak for themselves. 
Butler understands performativity as intrinsic to resistance and freedom, both as a 
way of bodies protesting on the street, and as a way of contesting norms which constrain 
identity and impose preconceived ideals of life. The act of freedom is suggested in the 
performative action of challenging a socially accepted norm, as commonly done through 
protest.  Conversely, Butler also recognises how speech acts powerfully perform on the 
individuals to which they are exposed. Thus, Butler is exploring both the performative 
action of bodies massed on the street and the linguistic performance attached to the power 
of naming someone or something. Although these two instances may seem dissimilar, with 
one challenging norms, while the other highlights how the discursive nature of norms act 
to constrain, what Butler is contending is that norms themselves can be both constraining 
and ethically desirable at the same time,  
Such norms are not simply imprinted on us, marking and branding us like so many passive 
recipients of a culture machine. They also ‘produce’ us, but not in the sense of bringing us 
into being, nor in the sense of strictly determining who we are. Rather, they inform the 
lived modes of embodiment we acquire over time, and those very modes of embodiment 
can prove to be ways of contesting those norms, even breaking them. (2015, p. 29) 
Both situations describe the performative nature of norms. Norms that are 
constraining and norms of protest and resistance which challenge previously accepted 
constraining norms. Both situations also reflect the integral nature of human socialability, 
as both are ground in our interactions with others. More importantly to Butler’s theory of 
resistance, is the recognition that coalitions of bodies gathered to contest a norm do not 
need to be homogenous, they can gather to enact their plural existence in a public space, 
nor will they necessarily make demands. Rather Butler understands their coalition and 
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public appearance as a demand in itself, to be recognised, to be made visible, to demand 
justice (2009, p. 26). This is in contrast to Standing’s assertion that the EuroMayDay 
protests were more theatre than threat, more concerned with “asserting individuality and 
identity within a collective experience of precariousness” than providing a set of demands 
(2017, p. 3). Ironically within Butler’s conception of resistance, Standing’s performative 
action of naming the precariat represents an act of resistance, although Standing’s 
conceptualisation of the precariat demonstrates how a norm can simultaneously challenge a 
pre-existing norm, desiring a more ethical outcome, while itself exhibiting new forms of 
constraint and/or a re-imaging of previous demarcations. 
Butler’s account of precariousness grounds an understanding of being in a 
framework of social interdependability that undermines a neoliberal concept of the 
individual. In this way she builds a discursive construction of human survival that is 
dependent on others. Gilson states  
social bonds condition my existence, rendering it precarious and, simultaneously, making it 
possible . . . On Butler’s account, therefore, it is the fundamental nature of precariousness 
and it universalizable quality that makes it a normatively salient concept, a basis from we 
might derive positive social and ethical commitments.” (2013, p. 46).  
Gilson argues that this is Butler’s most revolutionary idea. That from an acknowledgement 
of precariousness as a universal experience to all humans, originates a need to forge a set of 
bonds and alliances which then links our inter-dependency to the principal of equality, 
thereby undermining normative assumptions legitimising the unequal dispersion of 
precarity (2009, p. 43). Tsantsoulas (2018), however argues that Butler’s social ontology of 
vulnerability overestimates a response towards an ethical responsibility to the other, arguing 
that Butler’s contention rests on an assumption of democracy, egalitarianism and a 
universalisation of human rights. However, I believe that Butler’s liberatory politics 
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provides a discursive framework which challenges neoliberal identities of underserving 
populations suffering through their own structural inability to be productive. That the 
unequal dispersion of precarity is not natural, rather it is constructed and as such those 
most effected have the legitimate right to demand equality. The resignification of those 
populations as recognisable and equally valuable will ultimately disrupt neoliberal values of 
the successful individual being more deserving of a livable life at the expense of others. 
Precarious resistance then, would seem to be as diverse and multiple or as narrow 
and specific as the various definitions of precarity are. Both Lorey and Butler’s theories of 
precarious resistance are complex multidimensional, diverse and at times overlapping, 
much like precariousness itself. Both see precarious resistance  in big protest movements, 
which are often multi-layered such as EuroMayDay and Occupy, offering a rich glimpse 
into a new analytics of protest, which conceive of coalitions of bodies forcing a societal 
recognition of complex identities coming together to disrupt normative assumptions, as 
well as smaller, even individual acts of resistance. These coalitions may be only momentary, 
with groups breaking apart, then reforming along new multiplicities, protesting climate 
change, or immigration policies or zero hours contracts. Neilson & Rossiter (2008) use the 
example of taxi drivers in Melbourne protesting unsafe driving conditions, as an illustration 
of precarious protest that lacks institutionally recognisable organisation and multiple layers 
of identity and precarity (pp. 66-68). Both the state and police struggled to negotiate with 
the taxi drivers as there was no clear leadership hierarchy, rather there seemed to be 
different groups with different organisers. The protest itself included international 
university students who were on visa’s, limiting their work hours to 20 per week. Nielson & 
Rossiter make the point that this protest could be understood as “taxi driver politics, 
migrant politics or student politics” (2008, p. 66). They argue that the effectiveness of the 
strike, which lead to the government ceding to the taxi drivers demands, is that the protest 
was all three of these things at the same time. This is where Standing’s analysis fails to 
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grasp the complexity of precarious resistance. Instead in attempting to build resistance 
around a common identity and class solidarity, he misses those forms of resistance which 
sit outside his socio-economic demarcations and categories. Although Standing designates 
the precariat as the dangerous new class, Neilson and Rossiter posit that the danger is in 
the unpredictably and creativity of subjects in transit, which institute new experiences of 
the common which may suddenly flash up into political space, only to withdraw, recurring 
again in another space in another composition. 
 
Conclusion 
Resistance to precarity represents a new way of thinking and conceptualising resistance. 
Rather than a problem to be solved, new ways of analysing precarity in all its various forms 
and experiences, consider precarity as a contested social, political and economic space. As 
such, the problem of precarity becomes less about a binary dynamic linking security with 
freedom and more about a constant challenging of social, political and economic norms 
that structure and frame whose life is more livable. As a form of resistance, precarity 
challenges traditional mass protests, based on an industrial era dichotomy between 
capitalism and labour. Although Standing argues that the diverse disparate nature of the 
precariat is ultimately a weakness, other theorists such as Lorey and Butler contend that 
diversity defines both precarity and precarious resistance, allowing for an analysis that 
explores both individual acts of resistance, to slightly larger protests revolving around 
singular issues such as resistance to zero hours contracts, as well as larger social movements 
against inequality. While Lorey and Butler disagree about the basis for commonality with 
which to broadly build precarious resistance, they do agree that resistance should be 
focussed in disrupting neoliberal identity norms that entrench inequality. The breadth of 
their analysis’ does create a framework for precarity to be both a particular response to 
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socio-economic conditions and a motivating affect that can bind commonalities across 
disparate groups. This relates to the dual nature of precarity as both a socio-economic 
framework of insecurity and an ontological aspect of being.  Butler’s formulation of 
precariousness provides a common vulnerability and therefore a basis to build new norms 
of equality and democracy, offering a wider conception of precariousness as an affecting 
motivator and acknowledged commonality, that crosses all social economic and political 
lines. Standing’s narrow focus on creating a precariat class, does challenge political, 
economic and social structures which unfairly distribute resources, and creates a clear and 
concise set of demands, something both Lorey and Butler do not. However, his 
categorisations and hierarchisation tend to exacerbate differences and divisions, ultimately 
providing a context in which both Lorey and Butler argue, the autonomy of those made 
most vulnerable is appropriated, in the name of securitising and protecting, by those in 
more protected positions of power. In this analysis precarity reinforces asymmetric 
positions of power, with security and therefore freedom being dependent on the 
permission of those in authority.  Conversely Lorey and Butler argue that it is possible to 
have a form of resistance which maintains singular identities within a multiplicity. And that 
vulnerability and autonomy can co-exist, breaking a binary understanding of freedom as 
only being situated in security, thereby allowing those who are the most vulnerable to be 
heard and recognised. Although Butler’s definition of precariousness encompasses an 
ontological state of human existence, which thereby includes everyone, her delineation 
between precarity, precariousness and vulnerability and Lorey’s precarisation, provide a 
platform for demands which directly challenge narratives which justify the asymmetrical 
allocation of resources across different populations. Both Lorey and Butler offer valuable 
tools to analyse and explore the multi-layered complex movable dynamics that characterise 
precarious resistance as we move away from an understanding of Fordist work relations 
and industrial style protest as the only option. 




As I am re-writing the final draft of my thesis, New Zealand has been placed in a level four 
lockdown. Covid – 19 has spread across the globe, more clearly exposing our physical 
precariousness and paradoxically, our inter-dependability than any economic crisis could 
have. Although covid-19 is arguably democratic in its contamination, the rate of infection 
will undoubtably play out along well recognised lines of class and poverty.  
As nations respond to the threat covid-19 poses to their health system and the 
wider economy as well as their populations, there is already obvious differences. Some 
nations such as New Zealand are imposing strict lock-downs to minimise casualties and 
drastically reduce the spread of the virus, while enacting emergency social support 
legislation to provide financial aid. Other countries such as India have struggled to impose 
lockdowns, with eighty five percent of the Indian economy dependent on informal workers 
(Aljazeera, 2020). Government enforced lock downs have resulted in a mass migration of 
informal workers out of the main centres, as people who can no longer afford to live in the 
city without employment, begin the long walk back to their local villages. This will clearly 
have a devasting impact on limiting the spread of covid-19 in India. In this situation India 
is not alone, with Vietnam, Cambodia, South Africa and South American countries facing 
similar issues. Even historically wealthy countries such as the United Kingdom and 
America can be seen to be balancing the economic fallout of the pandemic overwhelming 
health systems and the consequent loss of lives, versus the financial cost of shutting down 
the national economy and supporting their populations through that period.  
As issues of individual precarious employment intersect with collective and state 
responses to the covid-19 pandemic, we can clearly see how specific forms of precarity 
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such as insecure work informs and contextualises our physical precariousness. Freedom is 
also increasingly balanced against the greater good, although who is represented by that 
greater good becomes patently clear when we look at the dispersion of deaths via covid-19, 
with much higher ratios among lower socio-economic groups often represented by ethnic 
minorities (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020).  
Freedom has also consequently been used as justification to challenge lock-downs. 
With freedom for some, those who want to open the economy up, weighed against 
freedom for others, those who are concerned about the spread of covid-19. While those 
who can afford to stay at home do, for those who must work to live, their decision 
becomes not on how to stay safe, but on what option gives them the greater chance to 
survive.  
Covid-19 has exposed the ambivalence of freedom and the intersections of 
precarity which represents the dispersion of those resources considered necessary for life. 
The discursive nature of freedom underpins the often contradictory definitions which exist 
in contemporary society today. Precarity often reveals those contradictions, with insecure 
work being associated with a freedom enhancing lifestyle and with a freedom limiting highly 
exploitative lived reality. Although precarity is a field of research that is currently popular, 
often freedom is an under theorised facet of their work. Isabel Lorey, however, places 
freedom as central to her theory of precarisation, as a governmental narrative. In doing so 
she emphasises the differential power dynamics at play, in the constructions of norms 
which rationalise a neoliberal ideal of freedom and precarity. By understanding both 
concepts at a population level and at the level of the individual, Lorey directly challenges 
the conflation of freedom with both security and insecurity, exposing how even self-
precarisation is often exploitative, commodifying an entire personality within the market. 
However, her empowerment subjectification dynamic conceptualises freedom as also 
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existing at the site of subjectification, underlying how opposing narratives of freedom can 
contest precarisation. 
With this in mind, Hannah Arendt’s essay on freedom provides both Lorey and 
Butler with an opportunity to explore a different definition of freedom. One that is ground 
in our socialability, recognising how our inter-dependability has provided a care network to 
offset our existential precariousness. This definition of freedom as a performative act, 
incorporating Butler’s ideas on speech acts both as acting upon us, even as we use speech 
to act upon others, extrapolates out Arendt’s performance within a polis. This underscores 
how discursive norms can produce identity, while equally creating contesting norms and 
different identities. Butler’s speech acts expose how freedom and precarity are contingent 
on others, while consequently offering a more complex multi-layered understanding of 
Lorey and Foucault’s counter-narratives. 
Precariousness resistance which integrates autonomy and vulnerability then 
epitomises a performative freedom built on coalitional politics. The diverse nature of 
singularities within multiplicities that often represent precarious resistance, fundamentally 
challenge neoliberal ways of living in all their various enactments. Lorey articulates this 
point “These kinds of rejections are not a deliverance from all previous neoliberal 
entanglements, but rather the beginning of engagements and struggles to no longer be 
governed and no longer govern oneself in this way at this price” (2015, p. 102). This offers 
an exodus from established relations of power and an opportunity to rethink infrastructural 
and environmental conditions that support a living set of relations in which a body exists. 
Rather than an analysis of precarity in which an overall loss of freedom is accepted, 
in this thesis I have offered an exploration into the different ways freedom and precarity 
inform and contest one another. This exposes the unequal power dynamics both at an elite 
level (government and capital) and at the capillaries of our society which entrench 
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neoliberal norms. However, in exploring the highly discursive nature of freedom, an 
opposing narrative becomes evident. One that acknowledges the foundation of our 
socialability as a form of security, from an ontological precariousness. A definition of 
freedom that is built on our inter-dependability and inter-relationality must surely ask the 
question; why some lives are considered more livable than others. I believe this is a 
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